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I
INTRODUCTION
In his well-known book on insider trading, Henry Manne reported the
outraged reaction of "an anonymous lady law student who in a classroom
discussion of the subject, stamped her foot and angrily declaimed, 'I don't care;
it's just not right."'1 By putting the ethical argument against insider trading in
the mouth of someone so obviously insubstantial by his lights, Manne began the
fairly persistent tendency of commentators to address the general morality of
insider trading as if it were a fuzzy abstraction, to be swept away easily with
more substantial and hard-edged arguments about specific fiduciary duties,
general economic efficiency, and property rights in information.2 This article
attempts to elaborate what the "lady law student" might have meant by saying
that insider trading is "just not right." I believe she expressed an important
intuition, and this article suggests a rationale for forbidding insider trading, filling
out the reasoning behind this intuition.
In the last decade and a half, the Supreme Court has developed a theory of
insider trading based primarily on an account of fiduciary duties that securities
traders owe to specific others, particularly those with whom they trade and,
perhaps, those from whom they receive information.3 The United States Court
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1. HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 233 n.42 (1966).
2. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of Rules Against
Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 10 (1984) (describing argument from fairness as "vague and ill-
formed"); see also FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 251 (1991) (chapter entitled Trading on Inside Information, criticizing fairness as an
unworkable and unwieldy idea because it has no specific content). Even Loss and Seligman, in their
thoughtful review of theories for prohibiting insider trading, collapse arguments about fairness or equity
into a purely consequentialist argument about confidence in public markets. LOUIS Loss & JOEL
SELIGMAN, 7 SECURITIES REGULATION 3451-54 (1991).
3. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). Chiarella and Dirks ground liability primarily in a duty to disclose
to existing shareholders from whom stock might be purchased. The dicta in those cases, and the
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of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York have not only followed the U.S. Supreme Court's
theory of fiduciary duties owed to shareholders,4 but the Second Circuit has also
developed a broader theory by embracing a prohibition against insider trading
based on a misappropriation argument.5
Given the general wording of both section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 19346 and Rule 10b-5,7 courts must bootstrap an interpretation of the law
of insider trading up from other general legal concepts, particularly from an
analysis of fraud as it has appeared in many different legal contexts. Much of
the controversy over the interpretation of Rule 10b-5 centers on which context
for analyzing fraud ought to provide the framework for the analysis of insider
trading. This article argues that both the analysis of fiduciary obligations to
shareholders and the broader analysis of fiduciary duties to sources of
information fail to address the more general ethical problem posed by insider
trading: when to require disclosure where the parties to a transaction have
viewpoint in Carpenter that attracted four votes but no opinion, indicate that the Court might be willing
to think of securities fraud as fraud on the source of the information, rather than fraud on the holder
of the purchased security.
4. See United States v. Chestman (Chestman II), 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct.
1759 (1992); Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Willis,
737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other
grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985). See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.
1968) (en banc), for the Second Circuit's approach before the Supreme Court's decisions in Chiarella and
Dirks.
5. Chestman H, 947 F.2d 551; SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v.
Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
6. Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
national securities exchange-
(a) To effect a short sale, or to use or employ any stop-loss order in connection
with the purchase or sale, of any security registered on a national securities
exchange, in contravention of such rules and regulation as the [Securities and
Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1934).
7. Rule 10b-5 reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
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asymmetric information. Although specific fiduciary obligations are important
to the analysis of insider trading cases, they should be viewed only as partial
elements in a more general theory. In my view, a fiduciary relationship creates
an obligation not to use any information acquired within the relationship only
because such relationships provide privileged access to information.
I will defend an "equal access" approach to the ethics of insider trading.
Such an approach has been widely misinterpreted in courts' decisions and
academic commentary on insider trading. The Court's majority in the landmark
cases of Chiarella' and Dirks9 assumes the claim for equal access to information
is a claim that the parties to a securities transaction should have equal informa-
tion,1" a proposition that is untenable not only because it is impossibly utopian,
but also because fairness does not require equality to extend so far. A theory
of equal access to information rewards investment in the production of
information in markets and also protects structurally disadvantaged parties in
securities transactions. Justice Blackmun, in his dissent in Chiarella, began to
elaborate a theory of equal access but stopped short of a full justification of it.
The equal access theory discussed in this article is grounded in contractarian
ethics, envisioning fairness as requiring consent to the rules under which benefits
and losses are allocated. Unfortunately, discussions of the "fairness" of insider
trading have been plagued by charges that fairness is a fuzzy idea that needs to
be clarified with the pure logic of economic theory. As a result, conceptions of
fairness not rooted in an economic approach have been criticized for failing to
provide any clearly defined sense of what would be prohibited. In the last
decade or more, the literature on insider trading has been dominated by
variations on a stable law-and-economics theme, where the importance of
maintaining the efficiency of markets has taken precedence over all other
normative claims. In their discussion of insider trading, for example, Frank
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel criticize Justice Blackmun's dissents in Chiarella
and Dirks as groping toward a conception of fairness that has no content. They
"suspect that few people who invoke arguments on fairness have in mind any
particular content for the term. Justice Stewart knew obscenity when he saw it;
Justice Blackmun knows unfairness when he sees it. It should be possible,
though, to supply a meaning."'" The goal of this article is to supply content to
Justice Blackmun's discussions of fairness by linking fairness to contractarian
ethics.
Part II of this article sketches the current Supreme Court doctrine on insider
trading, which grounds an obligation to disclose information or refrain from
trading in specific fiduciary duties, then argues that this doctrine is incomplete
in its historical understanding of what equity has required in similar cases and
inadequate in its understanding of modern corporate organization. Part III
8. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
9. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
10. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231-235; Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657-59.
11. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 251.
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examines the major competing theory of insider trading, the misappropriation
theory, which is based on a conception of fraud on the source of information.
This article shows how the misappropriation theory fails to consider equitable
rules that place limits on the sorts of property claims individuals and corpora-
tions could make in information. Part IV develops an alternative theory of the
ethics of insider trading, based on a contractarian framework that focuses on the
problem of unequal access to information in securities transactions. Part V
examines the ongoing debate about the justifiable limits of insider trading, with
special emphasis on the most visible and important recent controversy over
insider trading, United States v. Chestman.12
II
FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS AND THE FALSE SECURITY OF SPECIFICITY
As Francis Bacon knew, knowledge is power. 3 Nowhere does this seem
more true than in the securities markets, where the use of special knowledge can
lead to tremendous profits. The difficult question, however, is how to decide
when special and valuable knowledge becomes an unfair advantage. When does
"trading while in the possession of material, nonpublic information"' 4 become
fraud?
Unfortunately, the statutory and regulatory framework generates more
questions than guidance. The general language of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
does not provide a clear standard for deciding which activities are fraudulent,
and does not specify who should be the relevant target of such an inquiry.
Under a broad interpretation of Rule 10b-5, any deceptive practice, including
silence, that operates in the general neighborhood of a securities transaction,
whether committed by the transacting parties or not, might be prohibited. Given
the broad potential scope of enforcement, courts have tried to find a way to
contain an expansive interpretation of Rule 10b-5. Because violating Rule 10b-5
exposes a person not only to civil penalties in a Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") action or through private litigation but also to federal
criminal prosecution, it is particularly important to define clear and logical
boundaries for the offense of insider trading.
Courts have struggled with the problem of potentially unfair uses of
knowledge in securities markets for some time, starting well before the 1934 act
was passed. 5 While the issue was still handled as a matter of judicial cre-
12. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc).
13. FRANCIS BACON, MEDITATIONES SACRAE (1597), reported in JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS 179 (15th ed. 1980).
14. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 3448. Loss and Seligman argue that this is a better
formulation of the problem than "insider trading" because many of those brought into the net in SEC
actions against and government prosecutions of traders under Rule 10b-5 are not insiders in the narrow
sense.
15. For a brief history of the common law in this area before the 1934 Act was passed, see LOSS
& SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 3466-76. For a longer treatment, see Steve Thel, The Original Conception
of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385 (1990).
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ation,16 courts adopted one of three positions on the issue. In many states,
corporate insiders, interpreted as including officers and directors, had no
affirmative obligation to disclose the information used as a basis for their
decisions about securities purchases as long as no harm resulted to the
corporation.17 Other states viewed officers and directors as having a fiduciary
obligation to the existing shareholders to disclose any inside information before
buying the stock of the existing shareholders."8 A few other jurisdictions
developed a compromise between these two extremes, finding an obligation to
disclose information only where the particular circumstances revealed that a
fiduciary relationship existed between two parties before the sale of securities
occurred. 19
Given the diversity of common law views on the matter, it is not surprising
that courts have not interpreted the broad language of the initial regulatory
framework uniformly.20 Although courts still disagree about the proper grounds
for obligations under Rule 10b-5, the Supreme Court's recent analysis in terms
of fiduciary obligations to existing shareholders is the most pervasive.2" Under
the Court's current analysis, traders have no obligation to disclose inside
information before using it, absent some specific fiduciary relationship that
16. I use the language of "judicial creation" here to indicate that both equitable and common law
concepts were used by judges in this area before statutes fixed the framework at the federal level.
17. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 3469-72.
18. Id. at 3472-73.
19. See, e.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909), discussed in KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL
SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW 112-15 (1988). In Strong, the buyer of
securities from existing shareholders was also the chief negotiator responsible for bargaining in the deal
upon which the fortunes of the company rested. The Supreme Court found that had the shareholders
known to whom they were selling, they would never have sold their shares because they would have
realized that good news from the negotiations was imminent. Because Repide, the negotiator, sent
agents out to buy directly from existing shareholders without disclosing his identity, the Court held that
the shareholders had been defrauded by being kept in the dark about this material fact. As Henry
Manne has pointed out, however, it is not clear that the current Court would find fraud in this case if
the trade had gone through an impersonal exchange. See MANNE, supra note 1, at 22.
20. See, for example, the histories offered by Macey, supra note 2, and David Phillips, An Essay:
Six Competing Currents of Rule 10b-5 Jurisprudence, 21 IND. L.J. 625 (1988), in which competing
justifications of insider trading prosecutions have been offered.
21. The Court anticipated, but did not resolve, one obvious objection to this type of analysis.
Grounding insider trading prohibitions in a preexisting relationship between the insider and existing
shareholders would mean that an insider trading with material nonpublic information need only abstain
from trading or disclosing that information were she buying stock from a current shareholder. If the
insider were selling stock, there would be no such general obligation because the buyer would not
necessarily be a current shareholder to whom a duty of disclosure would be owed. Justice Powell's
opinion for the majority in Chiarella quoted the Securities and Exchange Commission, which in turn, was
quoting Judge Learned Hand to the effect that "it would be a sorry distinction to allow him [the trader]
to use the advantage of his position to induce the buyer into the position of a beneficiary although he
was forbidden to do so once the buyer had become one." Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227
n.8 (1980). The opinion then moved on to other issues without indicating whether liability could be
grounded in the sale of securities to someone who had no previous connection with the corporation.
Typically, insider trading cases involve people buying stocks on the basis of nonpublic information that
would lead to an increase in price. In Dirks, however, the Equity Funding scandal caused a massive
devaluation in price, so those with whom Dirks shared the information were selling rather than buying.
The Court did not think that this made a difference to the analysis, perhaps because Dirks was found
to have no fiduciary duty and therefore no liability.
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creates special conditions requiring disclosure. The Court's approach, expressed
most clearly in Chiarella'2 and Dirks,'2 results in a search for specific sorts of
people to whom a duty of disclosure is owed.
In Chiarella, the Court reversed the criminal conviction of a "markup man"
who worked for Pandick Press, a financial printer in New York that printed
announcements of corporate -takeover bids. In the extreme secrecy that attended
the preparation for such an announcement, the name of the target company was
typically not revealed until the last minute. Chiarella, by carefully studying the
announcements before the target company's name was inserted, deduced the
identity of the target company in five different deals. He gained more than
$30,000 in fourteen months by using this information to buy shares of the target
corporations so that he could benefit from the price rises when the takeover bids
were announced. The SEC caught Chiarella, and he agreed to return his profits
to the sellers of the shares. Chiarella was also fired by Pandick. Six months
after he disgorged his profits, Chiarella was indicted on criminal charges for
violating section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5; at trial, he was convicted on all counts.
The Second Circuit affirmed Chiarella's conviction, but the Supreme Court
reversed.
Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Chiarella, argued that traders have
no general duty to disclose to their trading partners any special information in
their possession at the time of the trade absent a specific duty based on a
preexisting fiduciary relationship. Claiming that the common law supported this
view, Justice Powell explained that any other rule would be untenable because
it would subject the possessor of superior information to criminal liability in all
transactions in which the parties did not have equal information. Without
specific statutory language authorizing such expansion of federal criminal powers,
Justice Powell was reluctant to urge a broad construction. Since equal
information could not be the rule, Justice Powell saw the primary alternative as
narrow disclosure obligations based on existing fiduciary duties.
Justice Powell then began the search for a specific party to whom Chiarella
might owe a duty. Chiarella could have no duty to the shareholders of the target
company from whom he bought the stock, Justice Powell reasoned, because there
had been no prior existing relationship between Chiarella and these shareholders.
After all, Chiarella was just a printer, not an officer or director of the target
company, parties that might arguably be in such a fiduciary relationship.
Although Chiarella might have had a duty to specific people if he had made
affirmative misrepresentations to them or told them half-truths while buying their
shares, in this case he was merely silent, so no obligation could be found.
Alternatively, however, Chiarella might have breached a specific duty to Pandick,
his employer, but since that argument had not been presented to the jury, the
22. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
23. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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Court chose not to address the question. With no specific, preexisting fiduciary
relationship on which to pin the duty, the Court reversed Chiarella's conviction.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall, argued in dissent that the
conviction should be upheld on a different theory of fiduciary responsibility: the
"special facts" doctrine found in cases like Strong v. Repide.' The wrong,
wrote Justice Blackmun, was not just in a breach of -a preexisting duty, but could
also be located in the structural superiority of access to information that
Chiarella enjoyed at the expense of his trading partners. Those with whom
Chiarella dealt could not know the information that he knew, because he worked
in a job that provided him with special information while his trading partners
were operating in the dark. If the trading partners wanted to find out this
information directly from Pandick, they would have had to break the law to do
so. But the illegality of its acquisition made the information no less relevant to
their interests. Chiarella, because he worked for the printers through which such
information passed, could learn things that others could not and this, Justice
Blackmun wrote, was the problem. Emphasizing that fiduciary relationships can
grow out of special circumstances in which one person is in a position to rely on
the special knowledge of the other in specific transactions, Justice Blackmun
argued that cases of structurally asymmetric information typically gave rise to
such a "special facts" finding. But these relationships do not necessarily require
a long-term preexisting understanding that information will be used in a
particular way. Chiarella, to Justice Blackmun, was one of those situations where
the very imbalance generated an obligation on the part of the knowledgeable
party to disclose the information: "I would hold that persons having access to
confidential information that is not legally available to others generally are
prohibited by Rule 10b-5 from engaging in schemes to exploit their structural
informational advantage through trading in affected securities."'
Though Justice Blackmun endorsed a view much like the one embraced in
this article, the majority opinion had a more limited picture of the types of
fiduciary obligations that create a duty to disclose. For the majority, duties to
disclose information arose only from preexisting fiduciary relationships. The
dissent, however, argued that temporary informational imbalances in transactions
created fiduciary duties, requiring disclosure.
In Dirks, the court further elaborated the majority's position in Chiarella.
Raymond Dirks was an officer in a broker-dealer firm in New York. He
specialized in providing investment analyses of insurance companies for
institutional investors. In March 1973, he received information from a former
officer of Equity Funding of America, a company whose primary business was
selling life insurance and mutual funds. Ronald Secrist, the former Equity
Funding officer, told Dirks that there was massive fraud occurring inside Equity
Funding and that its assets were vastly overrated.
24. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 245; see discussion, supra note 19.
25. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222 at 251 (Justice Blackmun, dissenting).
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Dirks flew out to Los Angeles where he interviewed many Equity Funding
employees. Though senior management denied the rumors of internal fraud,
other employees confirmed Secrist's allegations. After unsuccessfully attempting
to persuade the Wall Street Journal to cover the story, Dirks told other
investment advisors about the fraud he was uncovering. These advisors then
traded the stock in Equity Funding held by their clients.26 The price of the
stock plummeted, in large part because of the information that Dirks had
provided. Two weeks later, the California insurance authorities took action, the
SEC began an investigation, and the Wall Street Journal finally published the
story. Though Dirks had never owned stock in Equity Funding, nor had his
brokerage company traded in the firm, Dirks was charged with insider trading
because those to whom he selectively revealed his information had sold early,
avoiding the catastrophic losses that occurred when the scandal broke. Tracing
the flow of insider information from Secrist through Dirks to the early traders,
the SEC argued that Dirks had been a "tippee" of inside information and that
he had illegally used it in the market without first publicly disclosing it. Dirks
was found guilty of violating section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, but was censured,
rather than sent to prison or fined, since his investigation had succeeded in
uncovering a massive fraud. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the conviction,
but the Supreme Court again reversed.
In another opinion by Justice Powell, the majority reaffirmed its earlier
position: stock transactions in the presence of unequal information may be
established as fraudulent only if there is a preexisting duty to disclose based on
specific, well-established fiduciary relationships. In this case, Justice Powell
argued, Dirks was simply doing what other good analysts would do: research on
a company within his scope of specialty. Surely, Justice Powell continued, the
courts could not require that investment analysts reveal the results of their
investigations before using the information in market transactions.
26. Of course, investment advisors have obligations to their clients to act in their interests, and
selling clients' Equity Funding shares on the basis of this dramatic information would have fulfilled such
obligations. Should such advisors have also been brought in as defendants in the insider trading case?
If one believes the facts as outlined by the majority opinion in this case, then Dirks was engaged in
passing on the information about Equity Funding to anyone who would listen, thus lessening the
privileged quality of the information. If one believes the facts as outlined in Justice Blackmun's dissent,
however, then Dirks was engaged in passing on information to his friends and clients in what looks like
a much more selective strategy to benefit himself. In either event, it would be crucial to such a question
to work out what the understandings of the other investment advisors were about the circumstances
under which they were given this information. By the time this information travelled through this chain
of disclosure to reach investment advisors who had no direct connections with Equity Funding, the news
might be reasonably thought to be general knowledge. Just when inside knowledge becomes general
knowledge poses a sticky problem in the absence of some official announcement of the news. Arguably,
in this particular case if one believes the majority's facts, Dirks tried to make a general announcement
by interesting the press in covering the story, but when such efforts failed, he passed the information
through his own network of investment advisor friends. As Justice Blackmun pointed out in dissent,
however, Dirks should have made a general announcement by reporting what he knew to the SEC rather
than telling his friends who then dumped Equity shares and got in return "enhanced reputations for
looking after their clients." Such conduct by Dirks would have eliminated any question. Dirks v. SEC,
463 U.S. 646, 669 n.4 (1983).
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The problem in this case was more complicated, however, because it involved
a tip from an insider. An insider's tip to an outsider might constitute a breach
of a fiduciary duty to the corporation and to the shareholders. If the insider
violated a specific fiduciary duty by tipping, then the outsider "tippee" might
have a derivative duty not to use the information before disclosure, or at all. An
insider's tip would violate a fiduciary duty, however, only when the insider
disclosed the information in order to gain personally from the corporate
information. But since Secrist did not stand to gain personally in disclosing
information about the scandal, he did not violate a fiduciary duty by disclosing
the information to Dirks, the Court reasoned. Since Secrist had violated no duty,
Dirks then could not violate a duty derivatively. The majority argued in dicta,
however, that even if Secrist had breached his fiduciary obligations, Dirks could
only be held liable on a derivative theory if he knew or had reason to know of
Secrist's breach of an obligation not to reveal the information outside the
company context.
But once again Justice Blackmun dissented. Beginning with a statement of
facts that differed greatly from the statement used to begin the majority's
opinion,27 he argued that the motivation of personal gain by the insider should
not be the determining factor in assessing whether there had been a breach of
duty. In this case, Secrist had a duty both to the shareholders, whose invest-
ments were on the line, and to the company, as an officer. Giving up the
argument about equal access to information that he laid out in his dissent in
Chiarella, Justice Blackmun adopted a narrower view of fiduciary duty as resting
in preexisting relations of trust and confidence, the very view he criticized the
majority for holding in Chiarella.
What is wrong with the theory that only specific fiduciary responsibilities can
ground an obligation to disclose information to ignorant trading partners? First,
despite Justice Powell's claim that the common law bolsters his argument about
the obligation to disclose information, equitable rules invoked by common law
courts never supported such a narrow view of the duty in other sorts of
transactions. Second, courts understate the crucial role that a wide and dispersed
network of economic actors plays in the operation of firms by searching for
specific others to whom a duty is owed. As a result, courts place undue
emphasis on the search for specific fiduciary duties.
27. Justice Blackmun revealed that Dirks obtained some $25,000 in later commissions from those
to whom he had revealed the Equity Funding information. Those to whom Dirks told the information
sold $15 million in stock of Equity Funding, causing the collapse in the price of the stock. Surely, Justice
Blackmun argued, Secrist owed an affirmative obligation to shareholders not to reveal information that
would destroy their investments. Dirks should count as a participant in the breach by causing the
financial collapse. Emphasizing that neither Secrist nor Dirks told the SEC of the fraud so that all
investors could be notified, Justice Blackmun portrayed Secrist and Dirks as opportunists, not as the
good guys uncovering fraud that Justice Powell's opinion made them out to be.
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A. Looking for Fraud in All The Wrong Places
Given that Rule 10b-5 is designed "as a catchall provision, but what it catches
must be fraud,"' Justice Powell's argument in Chiarella rests heavily on his
interpretation of what the common law of fraud requires. In his view, "one who
fails to disclose material information before the consummation of a transaction
commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do so."29 A duty to disclose
arises if a secret-keeper induces reliance either through actively misrepresenting
the facts or telling half-truths or through violating a fiduciary duty or relationship
of trust and confidence. Justice Powell mentions no other duty-generating
possibilities that might create an obligation to disclose information.'
But courts have often construed equity rules to require disclosure in many
situations not involving specific, preexisting fiduciary relationships or active
deception.31 For example, though the concepts went out of use before the end
of the nineteenth century, American courts once used an equitable distinction
between intrinsic facts and extrinsic facts in determining when a contract was
undermined by a failure to disclose relevant information. Intrinsic facts
pertained to "the nature, character, title, safety, use or enjoyment of the subject-
matter [of the contract]; such as natural or artificial defects,"32 and they had to
be disclosed if they were not obvious to the seller. Extrinsic facts were
"accidentally connected with [the good], rather [than] bear[ing] upon it, at the
time of the contract, and may enhance or diminish its value or price, or operate
as a motive to make or decline [a] contract."33 Though this distinction was
never very precise, it operated at the core of the Supreme Court's decision in
Laidlaw v. Organ.34 The Court, in Laidlaw, found no duty for the buyer to
disclose information about the signing of the treaty ending the War of 1812 when
he purchased a substantial amount of tobacco. Disclosure was not required
because the fact in question was extrinsic (that is, about the context of the sale)
rather than intrinsic (that is, about the good itself). Although the Court did not
explicitly say so in its short, enigmatic opinion, the distinction between intrinsic
and extrinsic information could make a difference in this context only if there
would be an obligation to disclose intrinsic information-for example, defects in
the tobacco itself. This type of obligation would exist only if the distinction
could compel disclosure in arm's-length transactions, since the buyer and seller
in that case had never before met. In Laidlaw, the Court used the distinction
between intrinsic and extrinsic facts in a context where they could not locate a
preexisting fiduciary relationship.
28. Id. at 235.
29. Id. at 228.
30. Id.
31. Much of the discussion that follows draws on SCHEPPELE, supra note 19 (particularly chapter
7).
32. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 216-26 (1835).
33. Id. at 210.
34. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817).
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Though the language of intrinsic and extrinsic facts has since disappeared,
courts still require disclosure of hidden defects in goods. The distinction between
intrinsic and extrinsic facts has given way to a new distinction, between hidden
and obvious defects, that has much the same effect. Obvious defects do not have
to be disclosed,35 since it is assumed that the buyer can discover them as easily
as can the seller. Hidden defects, however, must be disclosed even when the
parties are dealing at arm's length. Courts have held that parties have a duty,
when selling a house, for example, to disclose hidden defects such as unstable
soil,36 defective septic tanks,37 and contaminated wells.38 Since none of these
defects would have been easily discoverable by the purchaser, the seller was held
liable for failing to disclose them.
Beyond requiring disclosure of hidden defects, courts also require disclosure
of material information in situations where one party has "special confidence"
in another. Typically, courts invoke this rule where
there is no existing relationship between the parties, and the transaction is not in its
essential nature fiduciary, but it appears that either one or each of the parties, in entering
into the contract or other transaction, expressly reposes a trust and confidence in the
other; or else from the circumstances of the case, the nature of their dealings, or their
positions toward each other, such a trust and confidence in the particular case is
necessarily implied.
39
In cases invoking this principle, one party appeared to be taking advantage of an
unequal situation by capitalizing on a special vulnerability of the other party.
For example, in Barry v. Orahood,4 Barry, an agent of the Pure Oil company,
bought land from Orahood, who at the time of the sale, was mistakenly believed
to be dying. Barry knew that Orahood's land probably had oil under it, but
Orahood was not in a position to learn of the ongoing exploration for oil
occurring around his property while he was seriously ill. The court found that
Barry had an obligation either to refrain from dealing with Orahood while he
was ill, or to disclose the information during the negotiations because Barry was
in a superior position to discover such information. Courts have used similar
rationales, premised on a finding of "undue influence" or the absence of "fair
dealing," to justify disclosure in other cases,41 without requiring a specific,
preexisting fiduciary relationship. The duty to disclose arises out of an unequal
bargaining position.
Courts have also found that parties have special obligations to disclose
information in certain types of transactions, although the parties to the
35. See SCHEPPELE, supra note 19, at 136-38.
36. Cohen v. Vivian, 349 P.2d 366 (Col. 1960) (house cracked and sank after purchase).
37. Rich v. Rankl, 269 A.2d 84 (Conn. 1969).
38. Janinda v. Lanning, 390 P.2d. 826 (Idaho 1964).
39. STORY, supra note 32, at 212.
40. 132 P.2d 645 (Okla. 1942).
41. See, e.g., Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 212 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 1968); Chandler v. Butler, 284
S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Ct. App. 1955); and Feist v. Roesler, 86 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Ct. App. 1935).
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transactions have no preexisting fiduciary relationship. One commentator has
described this general family of contracts requiring disclosure as
contracts in the negotiation for which one party must, from the very nature of
the transaction, have either actual or presumptive knowledge of circumstances
which ordinarily are not within the actual or presumptive knowledge of the other
party, and the knowledge of which is, or may be, of importance to that other
party to enable him to judge the expediency of entering into the particular
contract proposed. 2
Insurance contracts provide the most frequent examples in the case law, because
the person trying to acquire the insurance often has knowledge about specific
risks that an insurer would not know.43 Courts have held that parties seeking
insurance have an obligation to disclose relevant information.
All these situations extend the requirements of disclosure beyond the
boundaries of preexisting fiduciary relationships. Though the rules in question
originated in equity rather than in the common law, they were invoked by
common law courts in ordinary contracts cases to find obligations to disclose
secrets. The Court, therefore, in analyzing fraud in securities regulation, could
draw on this long tradition of invoking equitable rules to broaden disclosure
obligations where the statutory language presumed that the standards for fraud
would be found elsewhere in the law. As I will argue below, a theory of fairness
would require them to do so.
B. Underestimating Flexible Firms and Impersonal Exchanges
One of the big changes in the organization of U.S. corporations in recent
years has been described by David Harvey as the move from "Fordism" to a
"regime of flexible accumulation."'  Large, inflexibly organized corporations
with stable workforces (Ford-like) have given way to smaller, flexibly organized
companies that convert regular wage laborers and formerly salaried managers
into independent contractors who can be hired and fired as economic conditions
change (flexible accumulation). Firms that once primarily used in-house staffs
for their accounting, investing, long-range planning, public relations, legal
practice, and even janitorial and production work now increasingly contract out
these jobs to independent individuals or firms who provide services only as long
as the company needs them. It is becoming increasingly rare for workers or
managers to spend the whole of their working lives in the employ of a single
company. And with the growth of these new flexible structures, firms find
themselves dealing with many different actors, with whom they may have only
transient relations, but who need particular and often sensitive information about
the firms to be able to work for them. In addition, individuals increasingly find
42. SIR GEORGE SPENCER BOWER, THE LAW RELATING TO ACTIONABLE NONDISCLOSURE AND
OTHER BREACHES OF DUTY IN RELATIONS OF CONFIDENCE AND INFLUENCE 58 (1915).
43. See, e.g., Equitable Life Assurance Society v. McElroy, 83 F. 631 (8th Cir. 1897).
44. DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY 141-72 (1990).
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themselves working on contract for multiple firms over time, or even at once,
giving them the ability to compare this sensitive and detailed information across
firms to discern subtle differences among them.
As Oliver Williamson has noted, firms do not need to organize themselves
hierarchically into large bureaucracies to get work done because a regime of
specifically negotiated contracts will perform the same functions more flexibly
and, often, at lower cost.45 In the realm of economic theory, this organizational
structure has long made sense, but in the realm of economic practice, such
changes have only recently been enacted so profoundly in a variety of business
contexts. Throughout the economy, the boundaries between firms and markets
have become more permeable, less constraining, and often invisible. As a result
of these changes, it is no longer clear, if indeed it ever was, who is inside and
who is outside the modern corporation.
Though the term "insider" does not appear in the statutory language
regulating insider trading, there is a powerful sense that rules about fraud pertain
especially to people close to the firms whose shares are being traded, and that
Rule 10b-5 regulates the special knowledge acquired by being in such close
contact. Objecting to transactions using information gained in this way requires
some conception like that of "insider." But who is an insider anymore? In the
modern corporation, the distinction between insiders and outsiders is often
difficult to draw. Are independent contractors insiders or outsiders? What
about employees of contractor companies hired to perform work formerly done
by salaried employees of the corporation? Some commentators have tried to
alter the definition of an insider so that it better fits the changing world of
corporate flexibility, by defining a class of "constructive" or "temporary"
insiders.' Others have addressed this problem by changing the focus from
looking for insiders to looking for those who possess the material, non-public
information that defines the offense.47 The Court itself in Dirks announced that
it is willing to consider a broader range of actors to be corporate insiders for the
purposes of assessing liability for insider trading. Under the Court's analysis,
where "corporate information is revealed legitimately to an underwriter,
accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the corporation, these outsiders
45. OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICA-
TIONS: A STUDY IN THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION (1975).
46. See SEC v. Ingram, 694 F. Supp. 1437 (C.D. Cal. 1988) for a review of the cases, particularly
those criticizing SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983). The Lund court had a particularly
attenuated view of temporary insiders, finding that a friend of an insider who had been told information
about the insider's company and then bought stock in it was himself a temporary insider. The court was
apparently driven to this description because the insider had not breached a duty in giving information
to his friend and so the "fraud on the source" theory could not be invoked. In Ingram, however, the
California district court invoked more traditional agency principles and found that a person could
become a temporary insider only if he had impliedly or expressly entered into a fiduciary relationship.
Thus, Ingram, at a minimum, implied that there must be more than a mere disclosure to activate
temporary insider status. 694 F. Supp. at 1440 n.3.
47. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 3448. They say explicitly that Rule 10b-5 applies to people
who cannot be defined as insiders, so they would prefer to change the terminology altogether.
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may become fiduciaries of the shareholders" and so inherit the obligations of
more conventionally defined insiders.' In order to acquire these obligations,
however, the relationship between the temporary insider and the corporation
must be negotiated explicitly as a confidential relationship. If the Court is
serious about this extension, then its own analysis in Chiarella is in doubt, for
surely Pandick Press must have been in some sort of explicitly negotiated
relationship of confidence with the companies whose documents they were
printing. The Court, however, has not revisited Chiarella nor has it followed up
in extending this analysis in its other insider trading cases. As a result, the Court
has yet to find someone with such extended relations to have wrongfully engaged
in insider trading. The Court's analysis in Dirks as well as in Carpenter49
focuses on the Court's narrowest possible basis of obligation: between the
employing company and its most directly employed member of the chain of
disclosure.
The conception of who is inside and who is outside firms is in flux. But this
increased flexibility in modes of economic organization has not been accompa-
nied by actual cases in which such a broader conception of fiduciary duties is
found. The particularly narrow focus on specific fiduciary duties shown in cases
like Chiarella and Dirks constricts the number of fiduciary relations that produce
obligations to disclose at the same time that the knowledge that used to be
transmitted primarily in the context of fiduciary relationships is being spread
increasingly through more diffuse sorts of social ties. To keep up with changing
corporate conditions, courts should view relations of trust and confidence as
more contingently defined than they used to be. Despite the Court's recognition
of the possibility of such contingent relationships as grounding insider trading
claims, the actual pattern of analysis in specific cases has maintained the
narrower focus.
Chiarella itself provides an excellent example of the problem. Chiarella was
a printer who worked for a company contracted by various other firms to print
notices of their takeover bids. Had Chiarella worked in the printshop of the firm
about to make the bid, rather than as an employee of a contractor of this firm,
he might more easily have been considered an insider. Although not an officer
or director of the bidding company or the issuer, he would have arguably had a
preexisting fiduciary duty to his employer not to use, for his personal benefit,
information that could be used to his employer's detriment." But his organiza-
tional distance from the firms involved in the takeover bids was no doubt
responsible for the initial failure to present this argument to the jury at trial.
48. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983).
49. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
50. Former Chief Justice Burger made a similar argument in his dissent in Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 239,
but both the majority opinion and Justice Blackmun's dissent argued that this rationale had not been
presented explicitly to the jury, and so it would be inappropriate for the Court to uphold a guilty verdict
on the basis of an argument that had not been made at trial. But the theory that employees owe a duty
to their employers not to use the information gained in the course of employment for personal gain has
been developed by the Second Circuit as an element of a theory of misappropriation. See infra part III.
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Even if that argument had been made, however, it is unclear that the majority
would have found this relationship sufficiently close and specific to ground
criminal liability for insider trading.
In another case involving more distant relations between the alleged
defrauder and the securities-issuing firm, Carpenter v. United States,51 the Court
was asked whether the activities of a Wall Street Journal reporter, R. Foster
Winans, could count as insider trading. Winans had used for personal gain
information he had gathered in order to write his financial column in the Journal.
The Supreme Court did not explore the path that would have connected Winans
with the securities-issuing firms in some sort of confidential, or temporary-
insider, relationship through his acquisition of information of the relevant
information from the companies on the understanding that he was to use it for
his column alone. Instead, the Court chose to cite only the reasoning of the
appeals court, whose judgment the Court upheld in a four-to-four vote. The
appeals court in this case had noted that the language of Rule 10b-5 specifies
that the violation need only be "in connection with" the buying or selling of
securities and does not require that the fraud be committed on one of the parties
to the securities transaction. So, a fraud against the Wall Street Journal could
count as a fraud covered by Rule 10b-5,52 even though the Journal itself was not
engaged in the buying or selling of shares. And Winans could be seen as
defrauding the Journal in this light, not the firms whose shares were being traded
or the stockholders who bought or sold from Winans. Opting for an analysis that
tied Winans very directly to a party that was only indirectly involved in the stock
transaction instead of for an analysis that would have tied Winans less directly
to a party that was one of the traders, the appeals court reflected the general
preference of courts in this area to ground liability in strong ties of a clearly
fiduciary character rather than in weaker ties created only for specific instrumen-
tal reasons. As the complexity of corporate relations grows, however, the Court
may need to extend obligations that come with the acquisition of secrets to the
new and distant connections through which knowledge now flows. Fiduciary
relationships may need to be as broadly defined in practice as they are now in
dicta.
Increased flexibility in corporate organization is not the only structural
change in the organization of firms and markets that affects the possibility of
finding fiduciary duties. The whole field of securities transactions has become
sanitized through the near-universal adoption of exchanges as the medium
through which trades occur. As Henry Manne perceptively observed more than
two and one-half decades ago, obligations to disclose information have typically
been found in cases where buyers and sellers transacted face to face.53 Courts
generally have not required duties to disclose when buyers and sellers traded
51. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
52. Id. at 24.
53. MANNE, supra note 2, ch. 3.
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through impersonal markets, never meeting.' In cases like Strong v. Repide,"
where an agent of the buyer bought the shares in question in a face-to-face
transaction, and Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,56 where no stock exchange was
implicated either, courts have found duties to disclose to be more extensive than
in cases in which the trades are transacted through exchanges. When trading
occurs through the anonymity of markets, no preexisting fiduciary relationship
exists because no preexisting relationship exists, except in the narrowly defined
case of an existing shareholder trading with a corporate insider who has, as a
clear duty of his employment, the obligation not to defraud shareholders. But
all the other types of activities that used to create an obligation to disclose,
activities like actively concealing information, telling half-truths, and taking
advantage of a bargainer in a weak condition, no longer seem to create
obligations in an impersonal market where buyers and sellers rarely meet. In the
anonymous market, buyers and sellers do not engage in face-to-face discussion
about why they are buying and selling in the first place. In fact, at the time of
the sale, buyers and sellers do not know each other's identities, so they could not
have explicitly negotiated prior agreements about how they are to conduct their
business, nor would they have had the opportunity to create obligations during
the particular transaction. 7 In sanitized markets, buyers and sellers are not
present as concrete individuals with complex particular understandings about the
terms of the sale; they are abstracted entities who respond only to the terms of
the market-price predominantly, but also whatever information they can find
before they trade. The very medium of the stock exchange operates against the
creation of specific obligations to disclose information through interaction with
one's trading partner.
The development of anonymous markets, though far less recent than the
move to flexible modes of corporate organization, presents much the same
problem as the structural change does. When the whole structure of corporate
organization and finance is moving toward flexibility and anonymity, courts will,
not surprisingly, rarely find fraud in securities transactions if they are looking for
regular and permanent relationships. The social processes just described make
generalized exchange norms and long strings of connection between buyer and
seller far more common than specifically negotiated contracts and direct buyer-
seller trades. But the courts have not kept up with the times by insisting on old-
fashioned, specific fiduciary relationships.
54. Id.
55. 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
56. 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
57. In the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988), private rights
of action were explicitly extended to all traders whose deals were made contemporaneously with an
inside trade. The contemporaneous trader can sue an inside trader even if it cannot be demonstrated
that the contemporaneous trader bought her stocks from or sold her stocks to the defendant in question.
See DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT AND PREVENTION
ch. 9 (1991), for an explication of the new statute and its reach.
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In many ways, the current structural insensitivity of insider trading rules is
like the nineteenth-century common law problem presented by privity of
contract.58 Before tort law expanded to fill the gap and privity rules were
abolished, liability for defective products failed to track changes in the
complexity of manufacturing that the nineteenth century witnessed.59 In the
early part of the nineteenth century, contracts of sale typically involved two
parties, one of whom was the initial producer or longstanding holder of a good
while the other was the final holder or consumer of a good. Sellers could
typically be counted on to know a great deal about the goods that they were
selling, and buyers could be counted on to know the final purposes for which the
goods would be used. But as industrial manufacturing grew and advances in
transportation allowed many goods to be transported far from the places where
they were produced, the direct seller's knowledge could no longer be presumed.
Increasingly, throughout the nineteenth century, goods produced by one person
or company would be sold through several middlemen before arriving at the final
purchaser. If the good was defective when the last purchaser bought it, the last
purchaser had a permissible suit only against the person with whom he had an
explicit contract; the person who had directly sold the good to him. Since the
person with whom he had contracted often bought the good simply to sell it
again, the seller had little knowledge about the specific qualities of the good, and
the loss remained with the purchaser under the rule of caveat emptor. Courts
were reluctant to find sellers liable when these sellers had no way of knowing
just what was wrong with the things they bought and sold.
The gradual undermining of privity rules, most spectacularly through the rise
of tort liability,' eventually allowed legal doctrine to follow the changes in the
broader structuring of the economy. In the years between the time that the
economic changes took place and the time that the law caught up with them,
however, many defective goods were sold on the market.61
In the contemporary debates over insider trading, broader structural changes
in the economy that separate the holders of privileged access to information from
direct relationships with those who may be hurt by the manipulations of secret
information are not adequately represented in the doctrine of specific fiduciary
duties. This is very similar to the situation in which broader structural changes
in the nineteenth century economy did not produce corresponding legal changes
because they were blocked by the doctrine of privity of contract. But just as the
rise of tort law allowed the increasing attenuation of market relations to be
reflected in an expanded conception of legal liability, so too should a generaliza-
58. Brian Simpson argues that privity of contract was largely an invention of the nineteenth century,
rather than being a holdover of another age. See A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW OF CONTRACT: THE RISE OF THE ACrION OF ASSUMPSrr 475-85 (1975).
59. This argument is drawn from SCHEPPELE, supra note 19, at 267-98.
60. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACr (1974).
61. For the historical evidence, see SCHEPPELE, supra note 19, particularly at 294-95.
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tion of the equitable conception of duties of disclosure be recommended to
reflect the changing world of securities transactions.62
An expanded conception of equitable duties of disclosure should still have
clear boundaries, especially considering the fact that insider trading is subject to
criminal as well as civil sanctions. This article argues for such an expanded, but
clearly delimited, conception of equitable obligations primarily on the terrain of
moral philosophy. In Part IV, I Will show why a contractarian ethical theory
ought to be credible as a source of normative argument in the law and what a
contractarian argument would require in this area. First, however, I will examine
the primary alternate theory to insider trading, the misappropriation theory.
III
FRAUD ON THE SOURCE AND THE MISAPPROPRIATION OF CORPORATE
KNOWLEDGE
While the Supreme Court's narrow application of the specific fiduciary theory
seems to be shrinking what will count as insider trading, the Second Circuit has
been developing a powerful new theory that covers a wider array of possible
perpetrators in a wider array of situations. The misappropriation theory begins
from the premise that material, nonpublic information may count as property
possessed by a firm which is entrusted to employees and contractors under the
condition that the information be used only for corporate purposes. Any use of
this information for personal gain, whether by agents of the firm or confidantes
of such agents, or even thieves, should count as fraud.63 The misappropriation
theory can be grounded in one of two ways.6' First, appropriating the
information for personal gain counts as fraud on the source of that information
and, as such, is fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
65
within the meaning of rule 10b-5. Second, if information has been stolen, the
thief acquires a duty to the marketplace to disclose it, and trading on such
information counts as fraud.
Though a majority of the Supreme Court has yet to endorse the misappropri-
ation theory, the Second Circuit has found some support for its approach in the
62. In most other areas of law, disclosure obligations are already broader than they are in the
insider trading case. Expanding disclosure requirements here would bring insider trading law into line
with the analysis of fraud in ordinary contracts.
63. In the misappropriation theory, insider trading is an offense against property, involving the
conversion of property entrusted for corporate purposes to use for personal gain. This contrasts with
the theory proposed in footnote 14 of Dirks, in which liability for insider trading would be premised on
a breach of trust in a confidential relationship, where the violation consists in breaking a promise. At
the margins, these two arguments may merge in the common worry that employment relationships give
rise to expectations about the trustworthiness of employees, expectations that are undermined when an
employee either uses corporate knowledge for personal gain or violates an agreement.
64. Both theories were forwarded in the Brief for the United States in Chiarella, cited in
LANGEVOORT, supra note 57, § 6.02 nn.3, 4.
65. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10.b-5 (1992).
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opinions of individual justices.' Justice Stevens found the first argument
attractive in his concurrence in Chiarella, saying that a defendant might have
owed a duty of silence to those from whom he got the information. But Justice
Stevens agreed that the theory had not been squarely presented at trial and so
could not be the basis for upholding a criminal conviction on appeal.67 Chief
Justice Burger argued in favor of the other version of the misappropriation
theory in his dissent in Chiarella.' Quoting from Keeton's 1936 article on fraud
and nondisclosure in sales contracts, Chief Justice Burger emphasized that the
means the secret-keeper used to acquire the information in the first place were
crucially important in assessing the duty to disclose.69 When the secret-keeper
acquired the knowledge through an illegal act, the secret then had to be revealed
to those with whom the secret-keeper was about to trade, even though there may
have been no prior duty to disclose the information if it were lawfully ob-
tained.7' Since Chiarella's employer had an explicit policy against Pandick
employees using information acquired on the job for personal benefit, Chiarella's
use of such information for personal gain constituted misappropriation and
trading on it counted as fraud against other investors under Rule 10b-5. As
Chief Justice Burger concluded, Chiarella "misappropriated-stole to put it
bluntly-valuable nonpublic information entrusted to him in the utmost
confidence."71 On this argument, then, Chiarella's conviction should have been
upheld because the theft of information created obligations to fellow traders in
the marketplace.
The Second Circuit detailed the misappropriation theory in a series of
decisions following Chiarella, though the court clearly leaned more toward the
"fraud on the source" theory than toward the "duty to disclose from illegalpossession" theory. In United States v. Newman,72 the Second Circuit heard the
appeal of a man who had been indicted for securities fraud for first allegedly
trading on information he received from friends who worked for Morgan Stanley
and Kuhn Loeb, and then sharing the resulting profits with those friends. The
"connivers in this case," as Judge van Graafeiland called them,73 had converted
for personal gain information from Morgan Stanley and Kuhn Loeb, and such
"deceitful misappropriation of confidential information by a fiduciary" 74 could
legitimately result in a conviction. The sources of such information (Morgan
66. In Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987), the Court upheld in an evenly split ruling the
10b-5 conviction of a Wall Street Journal columnist. Something like the misappropriation theory that
underwrote the Second Circuit decision must have gotten four votes, but the opinion provided no
reasoning.
67. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 237 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 239 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 240 (quoting W. Page Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and Nondisclosure, 13 TEX. L. REV.
1 (1936)).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 245.
72. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1981).
73. Id. at 17.
74. Id. at 18.
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Stanley and Kuhn Loeb) had been defrauded, the court reasoned, and Newman
had been part of the scheme by those who were entrusted with the information
to defraud the companies through misappropriation. The court upheld the legal
sufficiency of the indictment on the prosecution's factual allegations.
In SEC v. Materia,75 the Second Circuit confronted a situation factually
similar to the one in Chiarella. Anthony Materia worked for a financial printer,
Bowne of New York City, and he guessed the takeover targets of bids whose
printing was being done by his firm. Upholding an injunction against Materia
and an order to disgorge nearly $100,000 in profits, Judge Irving Kaufman used
the "fraud on the source" misappropriation theory, likening Materia's actions to
the actions of an employee who used corporate funds for personal benefit.76
But, disagreeing with Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Chiarella, Judge Kaufman
explicitly rejected the argument that such misappropriation gave rise to a duty
to other investors to disclose the information. Instead, he argued that the fraud
was on the source of the information (namely Bowne), and not on the persons
with whom such a knowledgeable trader would deal (existing shareholders). For
Judge Kaufman, the essence of the offense under the misappropriation theory
was the use of the information for personal purposes in violation of a preexisting
fiduciary duty to an employer,77 an offense that would not have been lessened
(and arguably could have been aggravated) by disclosing it to those with whom
the secret-keeper traded.78
The misappropriation theory was further explicated in United States v.
Reed,79 on a motion to dismiss charges of fraud on the source. The facts alleged
in the indictment centered on Thomas Reed, who bought and sold call options
of Amax, Inc., during the winter of 1981. His father, Gordon Reed, was on the
board of directors of Amax and was chairman of the Amax Petroleum
Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary. Immediately before Thomas bought the
Amax call options, he learned from his father, in confidence, that Amax was
about to be merged into Standard Oil Company of California (Socal), which
already owned about twenty percent of Amax stock. Anticipating an increase
in the price of Amax shares as a result of this merger, Thomas purchased the call
options and waited for the news to be made public. Amax decided not to
support the Socal offer, but the price of Amax stock shot up when that news was
75. 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984).
76. Id. at 201-02.
77. Id. at 203.
78. In fact, one could argue that disclosing the information would only compound the offense. For
one thing, Bowne Printers could be even further damaged by word spreading widely that one of its
employees was trading on secret information and that Bowne therefore could not be trusted to keep
secrets. Perhaps more crucially, Materia's disclosure before the takeover was accomplished might have
the effect of making these deals impossible to complete. If Materia traded alone and secretly, then there
would not be a general run-up in prices to match the impending bid. If Materia disclosed to the market
before the purchase, the prices would immediately adjust, perhaps increasing the cost of the bid that
would be necessary to close the deal.
79. 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985).
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made public. Thomas sold his options two days after he bought them, making
$431,000 on the deal.
The theory the prosecution advanced in Reed was a variant of the "fraud on
the source" misappropriation argument. But unlike previous cases where an
employee was alleged to have breached a fiduciary obligation to his employer,
Reed involved a son who had arguably breached a fiduciary obligation to his
father. The prosecution did not allege that Gordon Reed had breached an
obligation to Amax in telling his son the news, because father and son often
shared business information in confidence as part of their relationship of trust.
But that fiduciary relationship between father and son obligated the son not to
use the information for his personal gain, in the prosecution's view.
The court reviewed the alternative theories of insider trading liability, finding
that Thomas Reed was not liable because he was not himself a corporate insider.
Nor was Thomas a tippee liable under the Dirks rationale because his father,
who was an insider, had not breached any obligation in discussing the matter
with him. Instead, the court argued that someone who receives information from
an insider in confidence can be criminally liable if he misappropriates that
information for personal gain. The origins of this sort of liability can be found
in the doctrine of constructive trust, the court wrote, because someone who
receives information in a confidential or fiduciary relationship is obligated to
hold the proceeds of any misappropriation of that knowledge in constructive
trust for the benefit of the person who initially disclosed the information.'
So, the crucial question was: Did father and son have a preexisting fiduciary
relationship? Since the concept of a confidential relationship was "born and
reared in equity" and "is by nature flexible and defiant of precise definition,"'8
case-by-case evaluation alone could answer this question in the light of general
principles, according to the court. In his detailed and scholarly review of the
principles underlying fiduciary relationships in equity, Judge Robert Ward
reviewed the evidence that a confidential relationship might exist between father
and son for one of two reasons: (1) where there has been reliance (one party
places trust and confidence in another with the encouraged expectation that the
other party will keep the confidence) s or (2) where there is de facto control by
a superior over an inferior (a disparity in position between the two parties
creates a dependency of one upon the other).8 3 If a confidential relationship
existed, matters shared between the two parties could not be used to the
detriment of the one or for the personal gain of the other. But kinship, by itself,
would not create a fiduciary relationship, absent some showing of an actual
practice of trusting.' What mattered for finding a confidential relationship,
Judge Ward wrote, is a reciprocal agreement in which one person's practice of
80. Id. at 700.
81. Id. at 701.
82. Id. at 706-07.
83. Id. at 708.
84. Id. at 712-14.
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entrusting secrets is met with express or implied consent, or with encouragement,
from the person in whom the trust was reposed. Confidential relationships could
not be unilaterally imposed, but had to grow from a mutual sense of trust. The
government would have to prove a confidential relationship based on such a
mutual sense of trust to show that Thomas Reed had committed fraud on his
father by using the information about the Socal merger.
Once cases like Reed showed that the fiduciary rationale could be divorced
from the employment context, its expansion into other sorts of confidential
disclosures was inevitable. In United States v. Willis,' the psychiatrist of a
woman whose husband was in line to become CEO of BankAmerica if a
takeover bid succeeded traded on information about the impending takeover
gained through the woman's therapy sessions. On a motion to dismiss, the trial
court found that the government could argue that Dr. Willis had breached a
confidential relationship. "It is difficult to imagine a relationship that requires
a higher degree of trust and confidence than the traditional relationship of doctor
and patient," Judge Cedarbaum wrote, finding that Dr. Willis had represented
through his agreement to treat Mrs. Weill that he would keep her confidences
to himself.' Dr. Willis argued that he had not breached any responsibility to
a market participant and, as a result, had not violated insider trading laws. But
the court, using the misappropriation theory, held that this was a distinction
without a difference.
The Second Circuit's misappropriation theory has broadened the range of
people covered by insider trading prohibitions. For this reason, the misappropri-
ation theory avoids the criticisms of narrowness and failure to track reality that
I levelled against the fiduciary theory.' But the misappropriation theory has
problems of its own. First, the cases that ground the duty not to trade on secret
information in the employment relationship rely on an expansive conception of
corporate property, one that threatens to deprive employees of any reasonable
claim on the contents of their own minds. Trade secret law has confronted this
problem and has drawn the line on corporate property somewhere quite
different,' for good reasons that should also apply in the insider trading area.
Second, in nonemployment relationships, the government, either through an SEC
enforcement action or through federal criminal prosecution, is punishing a breach
of trust that the alleged victim would be disinclined at best to enforce. The
securities laws on such a theory then become a means of coercion for the parties
in intimate relationships in ways that punish more than the party engaged in
insider trading and that use intimate relationships as springboards for federal
criminal prosecution. If the person whose confidence has been breached wants
to enforce these claims, there are tort mechanisms to do so. But unlike in tort
law claims of breach of confidence, where disclosing secrets leads at most to
85. 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
86. Id. at 272.
87. See supra part II.B.
88. See infra part III.A.
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damages against the breacher, the inside trader context involves potential
criminal penalties, not just for the person who trades on inside information, but
also for the person who revealed the information in the first place. I will take
each of these problems in turn.
A. Whose Mind is it, Anyway?
One need not put in eighty-hour work weeks to know that the contents of
one's job often account for a substantial part of the contents of one's mind.
People learn all sorts of things when they work in firms, from office political
intrigue to interesting industry gossip to valuable proprietary information. Any
of this knowledge might make a difference in securities markets if it affects how
that company or some other is run. At the very least, it would be difficult to
specify in advance just how to separate information that is likely to have a
substantial effect on securities markets from information that is unlikely to have
such an effect when all that information is mixed up together in the workplace.
Information that may affect securities is, in this way, very different from the
information that constitutes a protectable trade secret. With trade secrets, a
company's profits may depend crucially on information kept from competitors
about how a company's goods or services are produced. But information subject
to trade secret protection must be subject to careful procedures within the
workplace for protecting it; otherwise, it may not count as a protectable trade
secret.8 9 With insider trading, however, even office politics and other informa-
tion not traditionally the subject of trade secrets, if located at the right levels
among the right people, could make a big difference to the value of the securities
of that company or of some other company. Such information, however, is not
always cordoned off by special procedures from general knowledge available
within the office.
Under the misappropriation theory as it has been developed by the Second
Circuit, the use or communication that results in use of any material information
learned in the course of employment can potentially expose the discloser to civil
or criminal sanctions. Positing a fiduciary relationship between an employee and
his firm can allow the employer to use insider trading rules to block disclosure
or use by the employee of any material information learned in the course of
employment about any publicly traded company. The firm could sue the
employee under the private right of action introduced with the 1988 Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act--or the firm could turn the
employee over either to the SEC for a civil suit or to the Justice Department for
criminal prosecution.
89. In trade secret cases where the firm in question has not made special efforts to keep secrets
confined within the company, courts have been reluctant to find enough secrecy to enable the firm to
enforce trade secrecy protection. Contrast, e.g., Kodekey Electronics v. Mechanex Corp., 486 F.2d 449
(10th Cir. 1973), with Crown Industries v. Kawneer Co., 335 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
90. 102 Stat. 4677 (1988).
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Seen this way, the reach of the misappropriation theory is broad indeed. If
it can be established that the employment relationship alone can be the basis for
fiduciary claims that the employee keep all market-sensitive information learned
in the course of employment secret as an obligation to the employer, insider
trading law might be able to accomplish something other areas of employment
law have never been allowed to---extensive control by employers over the
contents and uses of employees' minds. And, as former Vice President Dan
Quayle once said, "What a waste it is to lose one's mind."9'
Courts do not seem to appreciate the practical difficulty in sorting out the
information employees must treat with special care from the information they
can disclose at will. The relevant formulation used in the employee misappropri-
ation cases is "entrusting." Knowledge is said to be "entrusted" to an employee
in the course of the fiduciary relationship of employment. But much knowledge
that an employee acquires in working for a company may not be "entrusted" in
any specific way at all. It could be learned as a by-product of working on other
projects around the office; it could even be generated by the employee himself
as part of his own work-product. 9 The information need not be about the
company for whom the employee works, as Carpenter, Newman, and Materia, in
particular, reveal.93 A vast array of potentially market-sensitive information
swirls around workplaces without having the crucially important bits singled out
for special treatment as the "entrusted" formulation implies. Is no information
acquired by an employee in the course of his job usable in the stock market
without risk of insider trading charges under a misappropriation theory? Can an
employee be held liable to his employer for disclosing market-relevant
information in a setting where those to whom he discloses have no obligation to
keep the information secret? If courts are looking to define clear boundaries
around the offense of insider trading, this is no way to do it.
Courts have addressed a similar problem in the trade secret context. In trade
secret cases, an employer sues a current or former employee for divulging,
typically to a competitor, information alleged to be a trade secret of the
employer. But not just any information can count as a trade secret. For
information to be the subject of protection as a trade secret, it must be both
secret and the result of a significant investment on the part of the secret-keeping
firm.94 The secrecy provision requires that the information be singled out
91. EDITORS OF THE QUAYLE QUARTERLY, WHAT A WASTE IT Is To LOSE ONE'S MIND: THE
UNAUTHORIZED AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF DAN QUAYLE (1992).
92. I am using "he" and "him" throughout this article to refer to inside traders not out of a
rejection of feminist inclinations in the use of pronouns but to call special attention to the fact that
almost all the inside traders are men. Though information may pass through a woman to get to the man
who then trades, women are seriously underrepresented as perpetrators of this offense.
93. In fact, the misappropriation theory is most likely to be used in cases where the information is
not about the company for which the employee works because that particular situation would be more
safely handled doctrinally by the "fraud on the shareholder" theory espoused by the Supreme Court in
Chiarella.
94. For a more detailed analysis of these cases, see SCHEPPELE, supra note 19, at 231-65.
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within the workplace for special attention.95 The investment element is crucial
in limiting the reach of trade secret law into the minds of employees, since only
those bits of knowledge that have resulted from serious acquisition effort are
covered. The investment and secrecy requirements serve to limit employees'
trade secret liability to a small and relatively clear-cut set of subjects that are
more likely to have been explicitly "entrusted" to an employee, or at least made
explicitly confidential.
Even with this limited set of items, however, there are some sticky problems
in determining when trade secret protections interfere with crucial interests of
the employee-for example, the ability of the employee to move on to another
firm in the same line of work. If an employee must not disclose anything learned
in the course of employment, he may not find it possible to get another job in
the same field or to continue to practice his skills. In Continental Car-Na-Var
Corp. v. Moseley' and Ridley v. Krout,7' courts held that employers could not
restrict the uses of former employees' general knowledge of chemistry in the one
case and bicycle repair in the other, though specific applications developed in
secret at substantial expense by the secret-keeping companies could not leave
with the employee. Narrowly carving out the knowledge that could be
maintained as a trade secret, the Car-Na-Var court found in equity "the right
inherent in all people ... to follow any of the common occupations of life....
Every individual possesses as a form of property, the right to pursue any calling,
business or profession he may choose., 9 8  If an employer could claim an
employee's general knowledge as the property of the employer, the employee
would literally have little to work with. Courts will not allow the property claims
of employers to interfere with such important rights of employees.
In the insider trading context, it is evident that the secrecy claims of
companies under the misappropriation theory can be quite broad, and can
quickly run afoul of the limits developed in trade secret cases. Potentially secret
knowledge is not limited to production processes or secrets of manufacturing, but
ranges across all knowledge that may be acquired in the workplace. Companies
can now exert control over their employees in ways that have been denied them
by trade secret law; they can claim that any disclosure of information that has an
effect on stock prices, whether of their own firm or any other, represents the
breach of a confidential relationship. Much of the problem here may be with a
broad definition of "materiality," but the company can use the breadth of this
definition to control its employees in many potentially objectionable ways. The
company need not claim much damage; since damage in insider trading cases is
notoriously difficult to demonstrate," courts have backed off from requiring a
95. See infra part III.B for cases that reveal the power of this distinction.
96. 24 Cal. 2d 104, 148 P.2d 9 (1944).
97. 63 Wyo. 252, 180 P.2d 124 (1947).
98. Car-Na-Var, 148 P.2d at 12-13.
99. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading
Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179, 195-96 (1991).
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showing of serious harm as an element of an insider trading claim. The injury
does not have to be actual, only "threatened."'" In fact, in most cases, the
primary harm alleged is the prospect of "sullying" the reputation of the
employing company for keeping secrets.' ' Virtually anything the company
thinks is important enough to sue over probably sullied its reputation. The only
harm that has to be demonstrated is that the company thought the disclosure was
that serious.'t °
Grounding liability on an employee's failure to keep secret information
learned on the job can have disastrous side effects on employment relations.
With insider trading law on its side, corporations may be able to use misappro-
priation theory to claim knowledge that evades the protection of trade secret law
as legally protectable corporate property. Corporations may also be able to
restrict the flow of knowledge that passes from their employees to others, even
in employees' discussions with their friends and family. If the employment
relationship is held to be inherently fiduciary and to cover all market-sensitive
knowledge learned on the job, working for any company is likely to entail a sort
of vigilance outside work that requires an employee never to leave work
obligations behind. And this is an enormous intrusion, especially when it is
backed up with possible criminal sanctions for any disclosure of work-related
information.
B. The Misappropriation of Intimate Relationships by the Government
As the misappropriation theory spreads out into other areas, such as family
relationships, friendship networks, and professional-client pacts, whole webs of
people trying to build intimate relationships by sharing information with each
other 3 may be threatened by one wrong move by one partner in a shared
secret. Since liability may attach not only to the person using knowledge for a
devious purpose, but potentially to people who have entrusted each other with
secrets down the line, the misappropriation theory might wreak havoc with
intimate relationships everywhere, as indeed it already has in at least one
case." Even if the liability itself does not spread backwards through networks
of tippers and tippees, cases brought by the SEC and federal prosecutors must
rely for their enforcement of insider trading rules on a breach of confidence to
a party who probably does not want to see a friend, relative, or loved one pay
huge fines or go to jail.
People already have some protection against the spread of the confidences
they entrust to others in confidential relationships by the "public disclosure of
100. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 55, § 6.02.
101. U.S. v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17-18 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 868 (1982).
102. In fact, the lawsuit may serve to publicize the company's inability to keep secrets and so could
be damaging in itself.
103. See SCHEPPELE, supra note 19, at 303-04, for a discussion of the ways in which shared secrets
build solidarity in intimate relationships.
104. See the discussion of Chestman II, 947 F.2d 551, 555 (2d Cir., 1991) (en banc), infra part V.
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private facts" privacy tort.105 But current tort protection differs significantly
from the sort of liability that the Second Circuit has constructed with its
misappropriation theory. First, if someone to whom a secret is disclosed has
used that secret to trade in securities, both the tipper and the tippee might be
found guilty under Rule 10b-5. The liability of the tipper in insider trading cases
would probably be limited by the Dirks requirement that the tipper benefit
personally from the transaction, even under the misappropriation theory. But,
as Professor Langevoort noted, the Dirks court "felt it necessary to extend the
meaning of benefit to cases where the insider was seeking to enhance his
reputation by conveying the information, or to gain the 'warm glow' that comes
from charitably giving tips to acquaintances or friends."1" If a person discloses
potentially material nonpublic information to friends, relatives, or professionals
in return for the warm glow of approval or even from the impulses to benefit
from friendship, it could leave the discloser open to criminal prosecution if the
friend or relative uses the information in an unauthorized way.1°7
Rule lOb-5 liability differs substantially from the protection accorded
confidential relationships under the privacy tort. In public disclosure of private
facts cases, only the person who has done the disclosing would be liable because
the person whose secret was being passed on would be the plaintiff. The person
who initiated the confidence is not held responsible for what is later done with
the information passed on and no one else can press the interests of the tipper
in the privacy context except the tipper himself." s
Second, under the misappropriation doctrine, the Securities and Exchange
Commission or federal prosecutors could decide to bring a legal action against
a trader on the grounds that he breached the trust of a friend or relative and
used information obtained through that relationship for personal gain. Friends
or relatives may be the last people to want to .see their loved one prosecuted,
especially not in their names. In Reed, for example, it is extremely unlikely that
Thomas's father wanted his son to go to jail for breaching his confidence, which
is, after all, what the misappropriation theory is all about.
In tort cases, since the suit must be brought by the person whose confidences
have been betrayed, legal action must grow out of the severance of a relation-
ship. Intact friendship and intact family relationships are unlikely to give rise to
these lawsuits."° But the insider trading cases can proceed on the basis of a
breach of trust in a relationship that is still intact. The coercion and pressure of
105. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383 (1960), for the influential division of a
morass of privacy cases into four neat subcategories. Public disclosure of private facts is one such
category. This tort has certain important limitations, however, most relevantly the limitation imposed
by the requirement that disclosure of private facts be to more than one or even a few people.
106. LANGEVOORT, supra note 57, § 4.02.
107. See, e.g., the discussion of Chestman II, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), infra part V.
108. Privacy actions are purely personal actions that die with the claimant and cannot be pressed by
others. See, e.g., Von Thodorovich v. Franz Josef Beneficial Ass'n, 154 F. 911 (E.D. Pa. 1907).
109. Since law is the means of last resort for resolving disputes for most people, courts would only
see cases where other means of resolution had broken down, along with the relationships in question.
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the lawsuit is then likely to be felt not only by the inside trader, but also by
those whose confidence provided the basis for the suit.
The use of misappropriation theory to reach cases where there has been a
breach of confidence in an intimate relationship is clearly coercive in those
situations where the person who originally disclosed the information to the
person who later used it does not want to press charges. The wrong, if any, is
to the persons with whom the knowledgeable trader traded, not to those whose
interests are allegedly being protected as sources under this theory. But that is
not the basis of the misappropriation theory. As we will see, there is a better
theory that still allows for prosecutions of people using information that can be
traced directly to a structurally superior source. But that theory relies on a
violation of duties owed to trading partners and not to those from whom the
information was obtained. It will be relevant to trace, however, just where the
information came from as a way of establishing the privileged access to
information possessed by a putative inside trader. We will see how this works
in detail in the next Part.
IV
A CONTRACTARIAN ARGUMENT FOR PROHIBITING INSIDER TRADING
Arguments about ethics as "fairness" seem to have fallen on hard times in
legal theory of late. The law and economics firestorm that has swept through
many areas of doctrine has hit particularly hard in the area of business
regulation, where efficiency rhetoric has always been strongest. As a result of
the influence of law and economics, arguments about the desirability of legal
rules in general, and rules about insider trading specifically, now tend to be
couched in consequentialist terms.11 Utilitarianism, the moral theory that
underwrites the law and economics perspective, involves weighing the net (or
total or average) good (or happiness or wealth) of an action against the
equivalent value of another action to see which produces the most desirable
results. Only the results matter in such a comparison, according to the
fundamental premises of utilitarian logic, and the highest value wins the ethical
game. One legal rule is argued to be more desirable than another because it will
produce better consequences overall than another, and in the law and economics
view, the specification of consequences is generally limited to the economic
results that would be produced from following one rule rather than another.
Ethics, in the world of law and economics, just is simply the comparison of the
110. In the insider trading literature alone, see JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING:
ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND POLICY (1991); MANNE, supra note 1; Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading
as an Agency Problem, in PRINCIPLES AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BusINEss 81 (J. Pratt & R.
Zeckhauser eds., 1985); Daniel R. Fischel, Insider Trading and Investment Analysts: An Economic View
of Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 127 (1984); Dennis W. Carlton
and Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REv. 857 (1983); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information,
1981 Sup. Cr. REV. 309.
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overall consequences of one rule against another. Any other conception of ethics
seems "vague and ill-formed," according to one influential commentator who is
committed to the law and economics worldview"
But are other conceptions of ethics that the law might adopt so "vague and
ill-formed" that they offer no help to the analyst trying to determine why a
business practice may seem to be "just not right"? I will argue that an
alternative conception of ethics has a strong resonance in American law and also
provides concrete guidance in working out how to think about the ethics of
insider trading. Such a contractarian theory provides fairer, more intuitively
pleasing results.
Surely one of the major contributions of American jurisprudence among the
world's legal systems has been the invention of a written constitution formally
declaring that government should operate with the consent of the governed.
Such a constitution prefigures its commitment to consent by establishing itself
through a ratification process involving a large segment of the citizenry as well
as by requiring a supermajoritarian process for amending the document."' At
the most basic level of American law, then, the explicit consent of very large and
crosscutting majorities is necessary to establish basic rules of the constitutional
order.
In addition, because the American Constitution is not just a document
detailing the structure of government, but one that also creates enforceable legal
claims of rights, the commitment to consent can be seen as especially strong in
the American tradition. Rights, in Ronald Dworkin's famous formulation, act
as "trumps" in legal argument.11 3  Because a person's consent cannot be
overridden except under very special circumstances, the individual who possesses
a right has the ability to block efforts to undermine or bypass her consent over
the range the right covers. The conception of consent that the American
Constitution stands for, then, is the strong version that requires the consent of
each individual for laws to be legitimate in areas where she has the protection
of rights. Rights cannot be obliterated or argued away in the name of other
values like efficiency,"' or even moral correctness." 5  The primary way in
111. Macey, supra note 2, at 15.
112. For accounts of the constitutional amendment process that bypass the Article V procedures, see
Sanford Levinson, Accounting for Constitutional Change (Or, How Many Times Has the United States
Constitution Been Amended? (a) <26; (b) 26; (c) >26; (d) All of the Above), 8 CONST. COMMENTARY 409
(1991), and BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). If one believes that the
Supreme Court is fundamentally a democratic institution responding to a broader picture of the consent
of the governed, then the supermajoritarianism guaranteed by the formal Article V amendment
procedures is not necessary to establish the claim that amendments rely on consent.
113. Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984).
114. Efficiency as a value is generally associated with utilitarianism. The original exponent of
utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham, was an ardent opponent of rights. See Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical
Fallacies; Being an Examination of the Declarations of Rights Issued during The French Revolution, in
2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 489,501 (John Bowring ed., 1843) (in which he denounces the idea
of natural rights as "simple nonsense" and the idea of "natural and imprescrible rights" as "nonsense
upon stilts"). For a modern exponent of the view that utilitarianism and rights are incompatible, see,
for example, David Lyons, Utility and Rights, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 110 (Jeremy Waldron, ed., 1984).
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which a right can lose its ability to block intrusions upon an individual is if the
individual consents to the intrusion.116 The enormous moral force of consent
is still visible throughout the criminal law, where consent to an action by one
party is crucial in assessing the legality of the action by another. Consent
converts theft to borrowing, rape to lawful sex. Consent has this force in
American legal doctrine because a contractualist picture of the legitimacy of law
runs deeply throughout American jurisprudence. In any account of the ethics
that underlie American law, then, the commitment to consent must be central.
In moral philosophy, a commitment to consent is generally expressed through
contractarian political and moral theories. Originating most persuasively in the
Anglo-American tradition in the work of John Locke and ideas about the social
contract,117 consent theory sees the legitimacy of government arising out of the
consent of the governed, much as the legitimacy of a contract arises out of the
consent of its constitutive parties. The contract metaphor, with free and equal
individuals agreeing in advance to be bound by rules that they have explicitly
negotiated, provides the basis for contractarian thinking and much of its
normative power. For the metaphor to be successful, however, both the
conditions under which individuals consent to government and the laws produced
by that government must be free of coercion, and it is in the specification of
these underlying conditions of consent that various contractarian theories have
diverged. Modem contractarians like John Rawls1 ' and David Gauthier" 9
disagree over how to construct the precise conditions in which consent is to be
sought, though they agree on the need to ground such decisions in the rational
choices of individuals. In the specific argument constructed below, I take yet
another tack, arguing that consent to legal rules, in the context of the American
systems, must be based on more detailed and contextualized knowledge of
specific features of American life and of particular individuals than either Rawls
or Gauthier would support. Suffice it for now to say that contractarian
arguments, in general, typically evaluate legal regimes and laws based on what
potential consenters would say were they asked for their views under conditions
that ensured they were free from coercion and other contaminating influences.
115. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, A Right to Do Wrong, 92 ETHICS 21 (1981).
116. A more complicated question, and one beyond the scope of the present article, is what to do
when rights conflict. There, the logic of the problem would seem to dictate that one right can trump
another, but such a specialized problem should not disguise the general pattern that the possession of
a right gives its holder the ability to block all those who have less important claims.
117. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (C.B. Macpherson ed. 1988 [1690]). But see
also THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (C.B. Macpherson ed. 1968 [1651]), for a much less attractive picture
of consent. Hobbes argued that in the brutal world of the state of nature, individuals would find it in
their interest to come together and give up their freedom for the privilege of living under the certainty,
safety, and potential tyranny of an autocratic ruler. Consent for Hobbes is given only once, and it can
never be retracted, not even by successive generations. Though Locke, too, sees consent as a more
thoroughgoing and non-retractable process than modem readers would approve, at least Locke's theory
had the advantage of grounding a representative form of government that would avoid some of the
harshness of Hobbes's sovereign.
118. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
119. DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986).
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A consent-based picture of the morality of law generates quite different
results from the consequentialist picture of morality that the law and economics
school invokes. In that utilitarian world, only the economic results of alternative
legal rules matter in assessing the moral desirability of the rules. In the
contractarian world, the legitimacy of a law is assessed by examining the integrity
of the process that produced the law in the first place. If one adopts a
contractarian view, law12 acquires its legitimacy from its procedural pedigree.
If laws are enacted in agreed-upon ways through representative institutions, then
the legitimacy that consent provides is passed on through those institutions to the
statutes themselves.121 Judges, where constitutions and statutes are unclear, or
where they are acting pursuant to common law or equitable rules, might
legitimate their decisions by conducting a contractarian thought-experiment to
work out the rules that individuals would have agreed to had their consent been
obtained in advance.1" Legitimate and ethical laws are those laws that
plausibly can be represented as the product of prior consent. Contractarian
theorists differ over whether the consent to legal rules must be actual consent of
real people, hypothetical consent of abstracted people, plausible consent of
familiar types of people, or something else.1" But the basic insight of the
contractarian approach, that the legitimacy of a law depends on its ability to
attract consent, remains the same across all variants of the theory.
Concretely, a contractarian approaches the justification of legal rules by
asking about the rules disinterested individuals who will be bound by a given rule
would agree to in advance. Individuals are considered disinterested if they do
not know how they would fare under the rules in any particular case. This sort
of thought-experiment is the hallmark of all contractarian approaches, but
contractarians differ on many specifics about how such inquiries are undertak-
en.124 The contractarian argument elaborated below will proceed by asking to
which rules about asymmetric information disinterested people recognizable as
current residents of the United States can plausibly be represented as having
been willing to consent-in advance of any particular cases arising under the
rules.
120. Not all law may be thought of in this way. Both the common law and equity, passed on from
"time out of mind," get their authority not from being the product of a representative government but
from being the embodiment of the authority of tradition. In my work, I have tried to show how much
of common law and equity can also be seen as having a consent-based moral logic, which takes it out
of the realm of tradition and into the more modem age of trial by reason.
121. This is an extremely abbreviated version of the argument that H.L.A. Hart makes. H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1962). For Hart, the legitimacy of a legal system rests on the fact that
substantive rules can be shown to have been enacted according to regular procedures which themselves
have been agreed upon by the population subject to the substantive rules. At the heart of Hart's
argument about legal legitimacy, then, is the consent of the governed. In making this argument, Hart
shifted the legitimacy-conferring authority from the superior sovereign to the people, conceived as
possessing rights to self-rule that they give up in part to a government devoted to acting in their interests.
122. This is the central argument of my book. See generally SCHEPPELE, supra note 19.
123. See Kim Lane Scheppele & Jeremy Waldron, Contractarian Methods in Political and Legal
Evaluation, 3 YALE J. L. & HuMAN. 195, 199-206 (1991), for a further specification of the alternatives.
124. For a review of the alternatives, see id.
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Several features of this approach, applying contractarian reasoning to the
examination of insider trading laws, require justification. First, why develop an
argument just about insider trading, or disclosure rules under asymmetric
information more generally, without considering the rest of the legal context in
which such rules will operate? Most constitutionalist contractarians focus on
designing whole systems and never get as far as defining specific legal rules.1"
These holistic approaches have virtues when one wants to design political
regimes from scratch, but when an existing, reasonably democratic political
system is already in place, such a system generates expectations that then provide
the basis for design of more specific legal rules. "Piecemeal" contractarian
arguments, those made in support of specific rules, are attractive both because
they give more concrete arguments that can be used to direct actual policy and
because an individual rule that can plausibly be represented on its own as the
result of consent raises no questions about intermediate violations of consent-
based standards in the process of enacting the rules.126
Second, why ask people about a rule in advance, rather than when a
particular dispute arises in which they are engaged? Part of the reason for
asking people ahead of time is practical: if you ask people engaged in a dispute
which rules they wish to invoke, they will typically pick the rules that allow them
to win in the current fight. And this would mean that a contractarian thought-
experiment would simply reproduce the deadlock that made one want to turn to
contractarianism in the first place. After all, if people could agree on the ground
rules and how they are to be applied in the moment of dispute, they probably
would not be in court having arguments about the rules. By asking people to
choose a rule without reference to the particular interests of the parties in
particular disputes, it is possible to detach the choice of rules from the outcomes
in specific cases.
Fairness provides a second reason why contractarians want to ask people
ahead of time to agree on rules to which they will be bound. To be fair, rules
should be chosen in such a way that no one gets an outcome that she would find
intolerable if she turns out to lose in the particular case. If a person finds herself
in an intolerable position as the result of the operation of a particular regime of
rules, then it is hard to tell a contractarian story about why those rules would
have been chosen. Asking people before they know how they will fare under the
rules in specific cases or before they know what situations they will be in
encourages them to imagine the worst that could happen to them under
alternative rules and to choose the rules that would avoid intolerable outcomes.
125. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 118 (in which he shows concern for designing the basic institutions
of a society and does not go so far as to elaborate what should be done in any concrete cases).
126. For a more extensive argument on this point, see Scheppele & Waldron, supra note 123, at 206-
10. The general point is that consent to an entire system may include specific provisions to which there
would be no consent if they were evaluated on their own. Enacting these first, therefore, would generate
a situation in which there would be no intermediate consent to the evolving legal system. Piecemeal
evaluation, looking at each rule one at a time, avoids this problem.
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This protection for the disadvantaged is one of the key moral components of
modern contractarian thought.
Finally, why should the parties doing the choosing be imagined to be like
current residents of the United States? Most contractarian theorists, John Rawls
for example, imagine ideal consenters who do not look recognizably like people
situated in any particular historical or cultural context.'27 And for some very
abstract problems in moral philosophy, like designing the basic institutions of a
consent-based political regime in the first place, this may be a quite appropriate
stance to take. But when one is constructing a thought-experiment about specific
legal rules in a legal system already fully shaped, a current historical and cultural
context would have to already exist in order for the thought-experiment to make
sense. For rules to be justifiable to people already located in a particular
institutional context, the rules must be justifiable to them in particular and not
to some abstract population. If contractarian arguments are designed to be
addressed to people like those who will actually be bound by these rules, political
arguments that reproduce these justifications in a particular context are more
likely to be met with a sense that those rules are, in fact, appropriate. In short,
the closer a contractarian argument is to one that will persuade people who will
in fact come under the jurisdiction of the chosen rules, the more likely such
people are to consent when the time arises for the rules to be applied to them.
Contractarian thought-experiments, then, become a rehearsal for political
argument to be carried out in the larger community of democratic debate."12
A. Obligations to Trading Partners
A contractarian approach to the ethics of insider trading focuses on what has
happened to those who are harmed. In addition, a contractarian focus on
morality and fairness generally requires that we look into the distribution of
benefits and losses, and not just their sum totals averaged over a particular
population. Contractarianism, in general, proceeds from the perspective of those
who stand to be harmed 2 9 by any particular social arrangement, for it is their
consent that is clearly most problematic in justifying the existing order of things.
People who benefit from any particular social arrangement typically believe that
the social arrangement in question is acceptable; those who lose, particularly
those who lose time and time again, will probably be the most critical of existing
127. RAWLS, supra note 118, at 136.
128. See Scheppele & Waldron, supra note 123, for elaborations of the argument in favor both of
making the imagined consenters more sociologically realistic as well as of making the results of
contractarian reasoning the basis for democratic deliberation.
129. One question that arises in insider trading regulation is whether there is any harm caused at all.
Henry Manne's attack on insider trading proceeds from the assumption that there is no harm either to
the allegedly defrauded traders (who would have bought or sold anyway) or to the market (which adjusts
prices of stock so that other stockholders are not hurt by the insider trading, only by the information
itself). See generally MANNE, supra note 1. Clearly, those who were caught on the outside of an insider
trade feel they were harmed, however. Whether this is enough to establish harm for the purposes of
insider trading doctrine is another question.
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arrangements. The contractarian who is worried primarily about the consent of
each individual to the rules of the game at issue will look first at whether a
disadvantaged individual would have agreed to those rules in the first place. If
those who lose under any particular rule might have had a good reason for
agreeing in advance to abide by the operation of such a rule, the rule is justified,
even if the individuals knew there were a chance that they would wind up where
they did.
The stock market, like a number of other social institutions, is a mechanism
for influencing the distribution of wealth; experimental evidence about how
people feel wealth would be fairly distributed is relevant to understanding
Americans' reactions to the design of rules affecting the stock market. In
experiments conducted by Norman Frolich, Joe Oppenheimer, and Cheryl Eavey,
people were asked, in a situation where they did not know how they themselves
would fare, to choose among rules that offered: (1) strict equality, in which
individuals' talents and abilities had nothing to do with the final distribution; (2)
great inequalities that came with some chance for each individual to win great
gains or to experience great losses as their talents and abilities dictated; or (3)
some lesser degree of overall inequality in which both extremes were brought
closer to the middle, where there are no huge winners but also no people who
fell beneath a certain tolerable floor. The subjects in these studies, contempo-
rary Americans, tended to choose the third option.1" Real individuals, it
seems, are willing to trade some of their potential huge gains to get a guarantee
that they will not fall below a certain level, but they are not so risk-averse or so
committed to equality that they would sacrifice any possibility of gain to be
guaranteed the maximum possible floor. In short, individuals like to take their
chances within the context of institutions that provide a safety net, even if that
means sacrificing the big gains they could potentially realize.
Results like these help to explain the moral attractiveness of the stock market
itself. Individuals want to be able to take chances, as long as they are protected
from catastrophe. The routine advice of financial consultants to investors, to
invest only with money that they could afford to lose, is consistent with the view
that people want a safe fallback position. Those individuals who invest
everything they have raise questions of basic mental capacity or fraudulent
inducement to invest, and at least some case law supports the view that such
total and innocent investors have a remedy against those who advised them to
invest without reasonable counselling.131 Banks and savings institutions are the
social organizations designed to provide the safety net for preserving one's
wealth; having limitations on the losses one can incur in these institutions is
130. See Norman Frolich, Joe A. Oppenheimer & Cheryl Eavey, Laboratory Results on Rawls's
Distributive Justice, 17 BRIT. J. POL. Sci. 1-22 (1987); Norman Frolich, Joe A. Oppenheimer & Cheryl
Eavey, Choice of Principles of Distributive Justice in Experimental Groups, 31 AM. J. POL. Sci. 606-36
(1987).
131. See, Chandler v. Butler, 284 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955). For cases involving litigation
against brokers by naive investors, see Berger v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 505 F. Supp.
192 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Cant v. A.G. Becker & Co., 374 F. Supp. 36 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
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crucial in meeting the concerns of contemporary Americans.132  The stock
market would not need to provide guarantees against total loss of what one had
invested as long as people were not encouraged to use the market as a home for
all their worldly resources. One sort of safety net in the stock market, therefore,
is the limitation of losses by the amounts people chose to invest.
133
Since the stock market provides a place where people can take risks, and
since empirical studies have shown that people prefer some risk to complete
equality, a legal regime of full disclosure in which all share the benefits of
knowledge available in the market is not likely to attract approval. Full
disclosure appears in the case law on insider trading as the "equal information"
theory described by Justice Powell in Chiarella."4 This option is not attractive
in contractarian terms, however, because it would guarantee the sort of equality
in the distribution of resources that most Americans do not accept, once they
have been guaranteed a floor. The stock market has to allow for risk, for the
playing out of one's talents and abilities, to meet the test of consent.
If, however, the stock market necessarily involves people taking risks with
their resources, a contractarian should ask whether people would require
constraints on the way that the market manages risks before its operation would
be considered fair. Here, rational individuals could see that they may benefit
from allowing inequality in the information with which people come to the
market because they might be able to benefit from it. Knowledge is one of the
ways in which talents and abilities manifest themselves. The experimental
evidence demonstrates that people generally want to be able to use their talents
and powers to try to gain advantage for themselves.
But people only like taking chances if they know that the chances are fair,
that the deck is not stacked against them at the start. At this level, fairness
requires that (1) individuals have a roughly calculable chance to win and that (2)
they are playing on a level playing field. Let me take each of these points in
turn.
1. A Roughly Calculable Chance to Win. A roughly calculable chance to win
is crucial to the legitimacy of risk-based institutions because complete uncertainty
about the risks involved cannot be dealt with rationally. For example, if you
bought a ticket in the state lottery, you would be taking a risk. You may not
know the precise parameters of this risk because you do not know how many
other people are buying tickets, but you can work out roughly what the range of
132. Various forms of federal deposit insurance in financial institutions were designed to provide
exactly this sort of safety net for the person whose wealth was entrusted to institutions that were
supposed to minimize risk.
133. Note how this argument provides a persuasive contractarian argument for the limited liability
of shareholders. If people can choose the levels of investment that reflect their willingness to take
chances, then they can adjust the amount of wealth they keep in reserve to satisfy their needs for some
level of security. If liability of shareholders were unlimited, then people would have to think about the
stock market as a place where truly catastrophic losses were possible, and this would require changes
in other rules of operation of the market if the institution were to meet a contractarian test of ethics.
134. Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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odds of winning is. Your attitude toward losing would be very different,
however, if you later discovered that the lottery commission had removed your
selected number from the set of numbers that could win without telling you. In
the first case, the risk was within your imagined scope of probabilities; in the
latter case, the probability that you could never win was not part of your
reasonable calculation in entering the lottery. If you had known that your ticket
would be withdrawn from contention, you would not have bought a ticket in the
first place. In fact, you would have good reason to suspect the state lottery
commission of fraud for doing this. The whole institution of a lottery presuppos-
es that winning is possible under the right circumstances. If someone deliberate-
ly withholds that possibility, they have changed the risks you thought you were
running and you would have good reason for believing the situation to be unfair,
even if the exact level of risk were not clear when you started.
Now suppose the state lottery commission announced that there was a
possibility that, on any given day, they would prevent your number from entering
into the set of possible winning numbers. You might then have no chance to win
on a particular day, but you still have the chance that this is one of the days in
which your number might sneak through. The element of calculable risk has
been restored, and the game can then emerge from the shadows of unfair
conduct, though at a higher level of risk.
What does this tell us? It tells us that some sorts of risks are unacceptable,
particularly when those risks involve secrets whose existence one does not even
suspect. These sorts of secrets may be referred to as "deep secrets." Deep
secrets are secrets whose very existence is hidden; one does not even know to
look for information because one does not know the secret exists. Deep secrets
present a hidden danger because the rational person does not take such
knowledge, or even the possibility of such knowledge, into account.
Thinking in a contractarian framework, people will want to know when a
secret may be deployed against them and they will want to be able to do
something to protect themselves from the secret-keeping of others. They do not
necessarily need to know the contents of the secret; they just need to know that
the contents of the secret are possible. Secrets that could count as legitimate
secrets, then, must be open to efforts at discovery or calculation to pass
contractarian muster.
This is why the disclosure by the hypothetical lottery commission of the
possibility that it will withhold the winning number some of the time makes all
the difference in the acceptability of the risks people then run when they buy
lottery tickets. The unthinkable has been converted to the thinkable and the
risks people run with thinkable alternatives are much more likely to be judged
as fair.
Such a transformation converts a "deep" secret to a "shallow" secret. A
"shallow secret" is a secret whose existence is publicly known. With a shallow
secret, one can tell whether a further search for information will be worth the
effort and one can also tell what sort of effort one could undertake to find out
the information.
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How do these observations translate into legal rules? Where secrets are
deep, rational individuals would prefer a regime of full disclosure because this
is the only way that they can protect themselves from the harm that would come
from unseen dangers. Where secrets are shallow, however, individuals would
prefer a regime in which secrets can be kept, because those from whom the
secrets will be hidden will be able to take preventative measures to ward off the
harms of secrecy.
In general, the common law of fraud distinguishes between deep and shallow
secrets. In Simmons v. Evans,135 the Simmons family was able to get out of the
contract they had signed to buy a house from the Evans family because when the
Simmons family moved in, they discovered that the local water company was in
the habit of turning off the water supply every day between 7 p.m. and 7 a.m.
Noting that no home buyer would be likely to suspect that the house had water
only half of the time, the court found that the Evans's failure to disclose
information made the agreement fatally flawed. The deep secret, deep because
no one would think to look for the information, had to be disclosed. On the
other hand, shallow secrets generally do not have to be disclosed. Courts have
found that there is no obligation to disclose obvious defects, information in the
public record, or things for which persons in the exercise of ordinary prudence
would think to look.13
6
These observations could lead to the view that insider trading should be
allowed as long as it were publicly known that insider traders were trading on
the market. This is just like the lottery commission that announces that it will
take your number out of the running on a particular day. Generally, one would
prefer not to trade with insiders and not to buy lottery tickets on the day in
which no award is given. But this can be seen as a risk like any other that
someone may decide to run. The practice of insider trading must be public if it
is to be permitted at all, though it would clearly increase the riskiness of stock
trades for all the noninsiders concerned.
There is, however, an important way in which insider trading is not like the
lottery example. Lotteries are generally determined by chance and so all one
needs to know are that the various possibilities that are built into the game in
order to work out roughly what the boundaries of the risk are. Stock trades are
strategic, however. That is, the investor attempts to determine what her trading
partner knows, while her trading partner is trying to work out what the investor
knows. In impersonal markets like stock exchanges, of course, negotiation goes
on indirectly because buyers and sellers do not meet and try to read each other's
signals. The only signal conveyed by the market is price and the traders must
attempt to discern what various prices mean in terms of the knowledge
embedded in the price.137 Because price is such a compact signal, one that may
135. 185 Tenn. 282, 206 S.W.2d 295 (1947).
136. For the empirical evidence, see SCHEPPELE, supra note 19, at 127-60.
137. See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Uses of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REv. 519 (1945), for
a brilliant demonstration of the way in which markets condense a great deal of knowledge into a price.
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convey many meanings, it is easy to hide superior knowledge in a trade involving
asymmetric information when the only information is the price of a stock, leaving
one's trading partner completely unaware. Inside knowledge, because it is not
easily conveyed in stock transactions, takes on some of the characteristics of a
deep secret. There is nothing in the market transaction to convey that the buyer
or seller is trading on the basis of superior information, as opposed to guessing
on the basis of incomplete knowledge or making a wild and ignorant trade.
Since fluctuations in price can mean any of those things, the inside trader can
hide his privileged position, though his identity, if one could ascertain it, might
give him away. The fact that trading with an insider will have aspects of a deep
secret makes it particularly suspect. While it may be possible to calculate the
risks of trading with an insider, it is impossible to determine from impersonal
exchanges whether one's trading partner is an insider or not. If people want the
opportunity to use their talents and abilities to gain advantages, then the
similarity between deep secrets and insider trading will cause legitimacy problems
on contractarian grounds.
2. The Level Playing Field. If insider trading were allowed, the fact of insider
trading would be a shallow secret, but not all shallow secrets are created equal.
The contents of some shallow secrets are much easier for some people to acquire
than others. While shallow secrets would generally be acceptable to those
deciding in advance on a series of ground rules for secret-keeping, such
individuals would not want to permit particular shallow secrets where the secret-
keeper could initially find information much more easily than could the target
of the secret. As long as one thinks one might be the target of the secret rather
than the secret-keeper, one would not approve of arrangements in which one
were doomed from the start. In other words, shallow secrets would only be
acceptable if all those who might find the information useful began on a level
playing field. This does not mean that all parties require equal information;
stock markets would be unlikely to work for long if all parties to a transaction
had to be certified as having identical knowledge. But it does draw attention to
enormous disparities in the costs of acquiring information in the first place. In
this regard, an insider will always have a significant advantage.
Why is this? Knowledge is one of the most crucial resources in decisionmak-
ing. Knowledge is an element of every aspect of a decision: One must know
what the alternatives are, what the costs and benefits are and how they are to be
evaluated, what you and others want, and how others are likely to estimate the
same things you are trying to estimate. If an insider is gaining information as a
result of working for a firm (whether as officer, director, employee, or
contractor) or through a tie with someone who does, then he has much lower
search costs than do those who must acquire information through concentrated
effort. Even brokers who know an industry must engage in research at some
costs to themselves. This research will be more costly than discovering the
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information by working for the firm or being related to someone who does.1 31
An insider has lower search costs for information than others who must engage
in efforts to learn the information, and this disparity in search costs makes the
playing field no longer level. Since inequality in access to knowledge has a
tendency to produce inequalities in everything else down the line, it is important
to ask what sorts of inequalities in access to knowledge people will be willing to
tolerate.
To understand this, let us modify our lottery example. Suppose that the
lottery were run so that it were possible for some people to figure out which
numbers would win by doing a sophisticated kind of research. In this system,
there is a lottery master who controls the relevant parameters of the game.
People who have been watching the lottery master for some time and know his
habits can guess better than others which numbers to bet. It takes a big
investment of time and energy to determine the habits of the lottery master, but
a specialized group of consultants exists to provide the information to anyone
who will pay them a fee. A contractarian will see no problem with this system
because any potential player can either do the research herself or pay for
someone else's efforts at finding out the information. There may be some
disparities in the costs of acquiring information, but only very large disparities
present a level-playing-field problem. Information in a system like this revised
lottery is still open to efforts at discovery, and for the people who do not have
the time to gather it, information is for sale.139
Suppose, however, that the lottery master could himself bet on the lottery.
Since he controlled the game, he, of course, would always win. Even if others
also happened to bet on the winning number, their gains would be diminished
by the lottery master's share of the winnings. One can see that this would
generate a lot of grumbling among the players, even if they were told in advance
about the practice. There would always be someone with superior access to
information who would always win. And while all the players would face an
equal chance of coming up against the lottery master, the pairwise comparison
of the lottery master and any particular player would always reveal radical
inequalities that could never be remedied no matter how hard a player tried.
The game would not be played on a level playing field. All the players would
surely agree that the lottery master should not be allowed to play. The lottery
master may vote for such a system, but only if he knew he would never have to
be an ordinary player.
138. Brokers may cultivate social ties explicitly for the purpose of gaining information. As long as
other brokers could do the same thing, there would be no problem with information passed on this way.
When information flows through channels that are not open to others, however, it provides privileged
access to those who learn at low cost through particularistic ties. The ordinary-language conception of
an "insider" captures this privilege of access.
139. The equality argument developed here would, of course, apply to radical inequalities of other
forms of property that would keep people from operating on a level playing field. This argument
assumes that people investing in the stock market have enough money to pay for advice.
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Here again, equitable rules used in common law cases generally support the
view that radical inequalities in social positions make suspect any agreement
reached in their shadows. Many of the cases outlined in Part II of this article,
where courts invoked equitable rules about fair dealing, found secrets to be
illegitimate. This happened in cases where the two parties to a transaction were
not roughly equally situated in the search costs they faced to find the informa-
tion. One example was insurance contracts, where information about the insured
is almost always more readily available to the insured than to the insurer."
Another set of cases involved "special confidence," where one party's disability
turned into another person's obligation to disclose information.14 In these
cases, and in others, courts have long looked to see whether the secret-keeper
had privileged access to information. In fact, even the cases about obvious and
latent defects can be seen as representing a commitment of the law to equalize
the costs of acquiring information because sellers who are in possession of a
good with hidden defects is quite likely to have an easier time finding out about
the defect than the prospective buyer who has no experience with the good in
question. 1 2 Where the secret-keeper and the target of the secret are not
roughly equal in their abilities and opportunities to acquire the information, the
existing law in torts and in contracts requires disclosure.
Equal access to information is the moral concept on which a prohibition on
insider trading would be grounded. When one person has special knowledge and
nonetheless trades with those who do not, the offense is not just that a secret is
kept. The offense lies in the fact that the secret is withheld under conditions in
which those with whom the secret-keeper trades cannot discover the information
as easily (or, as Justice Blackmun pointed out in his dissent in Chiarella,143 as
legally) as those who have the secret information. The target of the secret and
the secret-keeper do not have equal access to information, and that is the
problem.
Consider the following hypothetical. If an insider were to trade with another
insider, few would have moral qualms about the transaction. Under those
circumstances, the two parties to the deal would be on equal footing; such
equality of access to information underwrites the moral argument about secret-
keeping. But the contractarian argument reveals what is wrong when insiders
trade with those who do not have access to knowledge equal to theirs (not equal
knowledge), particularly where the insiders trade using deep secrets. People
would not agree to be part of a system where their disadvantage in access to
knowledge could be turned into disadvantages in the distribution of other
resources. They might be willing to take their chances on a system that required
them to work as hard as anyone else at acquiring this knowledge, but they would
140. See supra text accompanying note 43.
141. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text (special confidence case).
142. For a more complete argument to this effect, with many more examples, see SCHEPPELE, supra
note 19, at 111-78.
143. Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222, 245 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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not be willing to enter into transactions with people who are clearly advantaged
relative to them at the starting point. When insiders trade with people who are
in no position, or a distinctly disadvantageous position, to acquire the informa-
tion that the insiders now want to use, the insiders should have an obligation to
disclose the information or refrain from trading with these unequal trading
partners.
This obligation should extend not just to those unproblematically thought to
be insiders, like officers and directors employed by a particular firm, but also to
anyone whose position gives them special access to knowledge that others cannot
acquire. In the complicated world of corporate transactions, an insider should
be considered to be any person whose position allows access to information
unavailable to those with whom the insider is interacting. This does not mean
that all traders must have equal information; rather, all traders should face
roughly equal search costs in locating relevant information. Without such a level
playing field at the start, it is unlikely that rational consenters would agree to
such rules in advance. After all, why should one sign onto a system in which one
may be permanently disadvantaged? It is the structural imbalance in access to
information, as Justice Blackmun started to argue in Chiarella, that gives rise to
the duty to disclose.1" This argument is grounded not only in existing
equitable rules about fair dealing that courts have long invoked in determining
fraud, but also in contractarian ethics.
B. Obligations to Fellow Secret-Keepers
So far, this article has assumed that the only question one need ask in
determining whether disclosure of secrets should be required is whether one has
some obligation to disclose secrets to one's trading partner. But this question
does not exhaust the potential ethical arguments about secret-keeping. Secrets
have enormous importance not just when they are used in gaining strategic
advantage over others who have less knowledge, but also when they are used to
unite people whose common knowledge is a critical feature of their relationship.
In moving on to examining the obligations one may have to those from whom
one learns secrets, misappropriation theory and its alternatives become
important.
Each of us constructs the social world around us by disclosing special
information to those who are close to us and by hiding that information from
those who are not so close. Invisible boundaries in the social world are
constructed by these small universes of shared knowledge. Sharing knowledge
is one of the ways in which each of us creates a social space for ourselves, so it
matters to each of us that we have the ability to make claims on others to keep
our secrets and not to use against us knowledge gained from us while in a
position of trust. While sharing of knowledge happens in all aspects of life, one
can see these networks formed by shared knowledge quite easily in business
144. Id. at 251.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
where, as Oliver Williamson has noted, organizations can be seen simply as
dense concentrations of shared knowledge.145
Since shared knowledge is so important, one can imagine that people trying
to construct a binding social contract would want to preserve some protection for
secrets that may be initiated by one person and passed on to another. Here
again, the contractarian thought-experiment requires us to put ourselves in the
position of each of the actors in this situation and to focus on what the potential
losses are to each. Those who reveal secrets to others would not want to be
exploited by having those secrets used to their detriment. The people who
receive such information may want to use it for personal gain, however, and
would prefer to be able to use the secrets freely. The losses that would be
incurred if one could not use secret information are, in the words of economists,
"opportunity costs," the costs of opportunities foregone, rather than losses from
one's baseline position. Since empirical evidence about contemporary Americans
demonstrates that people feel that losses from the status quo are much worse
than losses from an imaginary ideal state, economic arguments notwithstanding,
opportunity costs are not as important in estimating well-being as are the costs
of losses from one's current position."
Therefore, any loss from one's current position would play a larger role in
designing contractarian rules than would losses in hypothetical opportunities. As
a result, people would favor the rule providing that the information they disclose
to others is protected instead of one that would allow them to gain at someone
else's expense. Rational consenters would, therefore, opt for a set of rules that
allows secret-sharers to enforce promises of confidentiality against those to whom
they reveal the secrets and who further reveal or use the secrets for their own
benefit. But such promises should be negotiated explicitly so that the recipients
of secrets are not unilaterally bound by the preferences of others, and there is
a clear expectation about what knowledge is to be protected.
In insider trading cases, however, the "persons" we are imagining may not
be natural persons, but may instead be corporate actors or "juristic persons." So
far, this argument assumes that corporate actors have much the same motivations
and moral claims as natural persons. Discussions about insider trading often
emphasize that the information used by insider traders is the property of the
organization, where property is seen as having been developed, paid for, and
currently owned by the corporation.47 In privacy cases, since information
arguably is the product of one's investment in oneself, one might use a property
rationale to justify allowing a natural person to keep information confidential.
But an argument from autonomy is a stronger one in such cases. An
autonomy argument would emphasize the importance of personal information
in grounding one's sense of oneself as an independent agent. Since corporations
145. WILLIAMSON, supra note 45.
146. See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, PAUL SLOVIC & AMOS TVERSKY, JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982) (collected essays).
147. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text (discussion of misappropriation cases).
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have no such psychological requirements, the extension of such arguments to
them is problematic.1" Therefore, corporations can make fewer demands on
the autonomy of their employees and agents than can natural persons, and any
agreement that knowledge may be used to bind someone in this way must be
made explicit in advance.
149
The argument that explicitly negotiated promises should be enforceable is
quite similar to those that courts have advanced in deciding "public disclosure
of private facts" privacy cases. Those who have acquired information from a
person under a pledge of confidentiality can be found liable for disclosing that
information to the detriment of the secret-keeper. For example, in Doe v.
Roe, 5 a psychiatrist published a detailed, only thinly disguised, life history of
one of her former clients. Finding that a promise of confidentiality had been
breached, the court found the doctor liable for invasion of privacy. In Home v.
Patton,"' a doctor was found to have invaded the privacy of a patient when the
doctor revealed aspects of the patient's medical condition to the patient's
employer.
In the insider trading cases, one must consider obligations that inside traders
have to those from whom they learned the secrets. Since the special knowledge
that insiders have is, by definition, knowledge available only within a particular
social setting that is not available outside that setting, such knowledge cannot be
used for personal gain by the inside trader without violating the expectations of
others in that setting. 5 2 Since a contractarian view should consider all those
who might be harmed by any particular conduct, this potential harm of disclosure
to those who share the inside information must be considered.
148. Many analogies have been drawn between corporations and individuals, analogies aimed at
extending individual rights to corporations. Psychological arguments about autonomy, for example, may
sound rather like arguments about a unique corporate culture which preserves a corporation as a
distinctive entity. But several hundred years of Enlightenment philosophy is basically unified on this:
Individuals are morally special in the sense that their autonomy and dignity are different sorts of claims,
more than claims for the autonomy and dignity of corporate formations. Preserving a strong version of
individual rights requires that individuals be able to opt out of collective formations that they find
oppressive. This would mean giving fewer rights to corporations than to individuals in order to preserve
this balance.
149. I developed a similar argument about explicit promises in Legal Secrets in the context of
discussing privacy cases. But in Legal Secrets, I took the contrary view on the question of the similarity
of natural and juristic persons, assuming that information about persons in the privacy context and
information about corporations in the trade secret context were functionally equivalent. See SCHEPPELE,
supra note 19, at 181-90.
150. 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977).
151. 287 So.2d 824 (Ala. 1973).
152. Some social settings may generate expectations that everyone in the group may use whatever
they learn in the group for personal gain. One might expect social groups of investment bankers and
stockbrokers, for example, to act in this way. If there are no expectations of confidentiality in a group,
then there is no offense to such expectations if the information is used outside the group. But where
there are understandings about confidentiality, as is more typically the case with groups sharing
nonpublic information, disclosure outside the group would in fact violate important expectations that
might ground liability for insider trading.
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Such concerns require us to modify the "misappropriation" theory of insider
trading urged by the Second Circuit, in cases like US. v. Newman 53 and SEC
v. Materia,54 to meet contractarian concerns. As we have seen in this discus-
sion, the wrong in insider trading consists of the willful misappropriation of
information that is explicitly entrusted, for a specified purposes, by a company
to the insider. Using the information for personal gain is misappropriation
because the use violates the explicit terms of the agreements under which the
information was conveyed. As Chief Justice Burger said in his dissent in
Chiarella, in these cases the defendant can be said to have "misappropriat-
ed-stole to put it bluntly-valuable nonpublic information entrusted to him in
the utmost confidence."'155 Misappropriation causes harm to those who trusted
the insider, either by denying them the profits from the use of the information
or, more frequently, by damaging the reputation for trustworthiness of the
company, as happened in Chiarella and Carpenter.
A contractarian argument would favor a set of rules in which individuals or
firms could bargain for and enforce explicit promises of confidentiality, with
three important exceptions. First, the worry about "safety nets" that is a
prominent feature of modem contractarian arguments would still be relevant.
Some secrets, collectively created and collectively enforced, still do severe
damage to people outside the group maintaining the secret. Such secrets,
because of the extent of the harm that they cause to those left out of the secrets,
ought to be disclosed to those who stand to be hurt by them, regardless of the
promises violated by such disclosures. Consider, for example, the Equity
Funding scandal that was the subject of Dirks.56 This secret about the ongoing
fraud should have been disclosed, even though the person doing the disclosing
was an insider subject to promises of confidentiality. Investors stood to be
seriously hurt by the Equity Funding scandal because the fraud substantially
affected the value of every investment in Equity Funding. If there was an
offense in Dirks, it was that not all those affected in the same way received the
same notification, and so some of those who faced great losses were able to get
out before their fellow sufferers were alerted to the danger. By the time the
information was made public, it was too late for those who had not received
early notification to protect themselves. Selective disclosure of critical
information of great importance to people's welfare is probably better than no
disclosure, but a rational consenter would insist on rules that gave all potential
sufferers the same information at as nearly the same time as possible.
The second qualification to the contractarian case for supporting a breach of
confidence theory has to do with the way in which harm must be demonstrated
by the original secret-holder to be enforceable in a misappropriation claim.
Under current law, criminal prosecutions are often mounted under a theory of
153. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
154. 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984).
155. Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222, 245 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
156. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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misappropriation regardless of whether the allegedly offended party is hurt or
not. In a case like United States v. Reed,157 Thomas Reed clearly would not
have wanted his son to go to jail for acting on a secret he had told him. Without
a concrete demonstration that his father was injured, the younger Reed should
not have been prosecuted on the basis of the fiction that his father was the main
victim of his dealings. The injury to the father was not that he was abused by
breach of confidence, but rather that he had led his son into temptation. If
young Reed violated insider trading rules, it was because he traded with people
who could not have known this information, not because he hurt his father.
Finally, the misappropriation theory, by virtue of tracing out who owns the
information and how it is being exploited, has a tendency to track criminal
activity through friendship networks. This, as noted above,15 8 is a very intrusive
use of the federal criminal enforcement powers. If one person shares a secret
with another with the expectation of creating a friendship or other relationship
of trust, the violation of that trust by the tippee should not echo back through
the chain of disclosure implicating everyone in its trail. If someone entrusted
with a secret uses it for his own benefit, then he and he alone should pay for it
unless others act in conspiracy with him. But trusting someone with information
that one has not used for personal gain should not be made into an offense
because the person to whom one gave the information then used it illegally.
The arguments in this Part and the arguments about equality of access to
information in the last Part are strongly connected. If someone, by virtue of ties
of friendship, common employment, or contract, learns information that would
be relevant to a stock trade, then he cannot use it in trades with others who
cannot have learned such information. Particularistic ties, like those that arise
through friendship, employment, or contract, are, by definition, not open to
everyone. Not everyone could be in such a position to acquire information.
Inequality of access is the primary reason why information learned in such
particularistic ways should not be used in trades against those who are ignorant.
The insider who knows a secret knows it through ties that both provide the
information and reduce the costs of acquiring it. Insiders have much cheaper
search costs precisely because their connections give them better access to
information. Because of the combined effects of these privileges, insiders should
be prevented from trading with those who are much less privileged.
As we have seen in this Part, then, a contractarian argument supports an
equal access theory when an insider uses inside information against ignorant
trading partners, and a modified enforceable promise theory when information
is disclosed outside of circles of confidence. In both cases, the potential for
severe losses triggers full disclosure. In cases where full disclosure to an ignorant
trading partner would violate the promises of confidentiality that the inside
trader has made to others, the insider should refrain both from trading against
157. 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985).
158. See supra text accompanying note 109.
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ignorant partners and from disclosing the information in violation of promises.
This "disclose or abstain" rule is quite close to the rule adopted by the Securities
and Exchange Commission in its landmark case In re Cady, Roberts and Co.,159
and by the Second Circuit in its important ruling in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co.16 The Supreme Court reinterpreted Cady to assimilate it to a theory of
fiduciary duties.16' But the Cady and Texas Gulf Sulphur line of cases settles
on a formula by which traders must disclose the information they have gained
in ways others could not, or refrain from trading with others who do not have
equal access to information. Contractarian arguments seem to duplicate some
elements of insider trading doctrine, though not for the reasons that the Supreme
Court has outlined.
V
CONTRACTARIAN EVALUATION OF RECENT DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENTS
In 1986, Ira Waldbaum, president of the Waldbaum supermarket company
and head of the family that together owned fifty-one percent of the company's
shares, agreed to sell Waldbaum to A&P. In this deal, Ira sold his controlling
block of Waldbaum shares to A&P for about double their current market price.
Two days after agreeing to this sale, Ira told three of his children, his sister
(Shirley Witkin) and his nephew (Robert Karin) about the deal, offering to
tender their shares with his own to simplify the transactions. All were told that
the information about the sale was to be kept highly confidential. Shirley
Witkin, however, told her daughter (Susan Loeb), warning her not to tell anyone
except her husband. Daughter Susan told the news to her husband Keith Loeb,
telling him not to tell anyone because "it could possibly ruin the sale., 162 The
next morning, Keith called his broker, Robert Chestman, and told Chestman that
he had "some definite, some accurate information" '163 about the sale of the
Waldbaum grocery chain. Chestman knew that Loeb's wife was a member of the
Waldbaum family, and so he was able to surmise that the information came on
good authority. But Chestman declined, when asked, to provide advice to Keith
on what he should do about the matter. Later that morning, Chestman bought
3000 shares of Waldbaum stock for his own account, and shortly after that, he
bought 8000 shares for his clients' discretionary accounts. Prices ranged between
$25.75 and $26 for Chestman's purchases. Later that day, Keith called Chestman
again and asked him again what to do. Chestman again said that he could not
advise Keith "in a situation like this" but added that on the basis of research
Chestman himself had done, he thought that Waldbaum would make a good
investment. Keith then bought 1000 shares of Waldbaum stock. The next day,
159. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
160. 401 F.2d 833 (1968) (en banc).
161. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227 n.8; Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653-54 (1982).
162. Chestman II, 947 F.2d 551, 555 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1759 (1992).
163. Id.
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when news of the tender offer was publicly announced, stock prices rose to $49
per share. Charged with insider trading, Keith Loeb agreed to disgorge his
profits and pay a fine. Chestman was charged with and convicted of multiple
criminal counts of insider trading, fraudulent trading in connection with a tender
offer (a violation of Rule 14e-31 4), mail fraud, and perjury. Though
Chestman's story about what happened differed substantially from this rendering
at trial, the jury that convicted him on all counts did not believe his version. A
panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed all the convictions,"
but in the rehearing the en banc court chose to deviate from the panel's decision
by reversing the trial court's convictions under Rule 10b-5 and mail fraud, while
upholding the convictions under Rule 14e-3." 6 I will not discuss the court's
decision on the Rule 14e-3 counts, but will concentrate on the Rule 10b-5 claim,
on which the court split nearly down the middle.
Judge Meskill, writing for the majority in votes if not in reasoning, reviewed
the various theories on which Chestman's criminal conviction might be based.
Under the traditional theory of fiduciary duties, a finding of fraud is predicated
on a traceable breach of a duty, but a fiduciary duty cannot be created by the
mere possession of information not in the possession of another. Under the
misappropriation theory, not yet approved by the Supreme Court but in clear
favor in the Second Circuit, a person can be found guilty of fraud when he uses
the information obtained through an employment relationship for his own
personal benefit. The two theories merge, Judge Meskill argued, over the idea
of a "temporary insider," one who owes a duty to his employer not to use
information but who then uses it anyway in breach of a fiduciary duty. The
difficulty in evaluating the charges against Robert Chestman, Judge Meskill
wrote, was that the relevant breach of duty by an insider here did not arise in the
context of an employment relationship, but instead in the context of a family
relationship.167 And here, the various theories seemed to provide Judge
Meskill with little help.
In employment relationships, Judge Meskill argued, duties are clearer, the
boundaries of legitimate disclosure are more firmly fixed, and fiduciary
relationships are more clearly distinguishable from nonfiduciary ones. In
families, however, the existence of fiduciary relationships cannot be presumed
and may be difficult to determine. Worries about due process and fair notice
may arise if a court were to find certain family relationships sufficient to ground
claims of breach of duty while other family relationships could not sustain such
claims. Fiduciary relationships, Judge Meskill argued, require an aspect of
dominance, or reliance by the party doing the trusting on the party being
164. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) is the enabling statute; 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 is the relevant rule.
165. United States v. Chestman, 903 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990).
166. Chestman II, 947 F.2d at 571. The en banc court did not hear an appeal from the perjury
charge.
167. Id.
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trusted.1" But in family relationships, disclosures are made gratuitously in
contexts where there is no reliance or presumed superiority of one party to
another and they occur without explicit negotiations about how the information
in question is to be used. In the present case, Judge Meskill found that Keith
Loeb did not have a fiduciary relationship with the Waldbaum family because
there was no evidence that the family routinely talked about the family business
with Keith, because he had not been brought into the family circle, because his
wife communicated this important information to him gratuitously even though
no one else expected or wanted her to tell him, and because there was no special
influence or reliance between Keith Loeb and the Waldbaums.169 The court
also found that there was no fiduciary relationship between Keith and Susan
Loeb because she told him the information without being prompted and without
first extracting a promise of confidentiality. Since Keith was not in a fiduciary
relationship with his in-laws or his wife, he breached no duty and, therefore,
Chestman could breach no duty derivatively.170
Judge Winter, in dissent, argued that Chestman's convictions on Rule 10b-5
should have been upheld under both the fiduciary duty theory and the
misappropriation theory.17 1 On the fiduciary theory, Judge Winter pointed out
that in family-controlled corporations like Waldbaum, confidential information
about the business is a routine part of family conversations. To maintain
informal family relationships so that such conversations could go on, a duty not
to disclose must be presumed in such cases. Judge Winter would have found that
Keith Loeb owed a duty to the Waldbaum family, a duty breached in telling
Chestman, who then exploited this breach by trading on the inside informa-
tion.172
Judge Winter's dissent was heavily influenced by the law-and-economics
writing on the matter. He noted that information is one of the most valuable
commodities in securities markets and those who have invested in producing it
should be able to reap profits from their efforts in acquiring it, as long as the
means of acquiring the information did not amount to theft. Misappropriation
theory, according to Judge Winter, 173 has a solid policy argument behind it; the
theory ensures that information important to markets continues to be produced
by providing protection for such investments and by allowing those who produce
information to profit from it. Keith Loeb's activities, however, amounted to theft
of family property. The advance purchases made on this inside information by
Chestman threatened to release the information to the public, and such a release
168. Id.
169. Id. at 570-71.
170. While most husbands and wives would probably be alarmed to learn that they are not in a
fiduciary relationship, Keith and Susan were no doubt relieved by this finding because it meant that
Keith's broker could not be found guilty of insider trading and that Keith, had he been charged, would
not have been found guilty either.
171. Id. at 571, 579-80.
172. Id. at 579.
173. Id. at 578.
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would have harmed the family. Under both theories, then, Judge Winter would
have upheld Chestman's convictions under Rule 10b-5.
What would a contractarian say about this case? First, a contractarian would
want to consider the obligations to the trading partners with whom Chestman
dealt through the anonymity of a stock exchange. Existing nonfamily sharehold-
ers could not know the information that Chestman knew because this informa-
tion was kept solely within the Waldbaum family. Chestman's access to the
information was clearly superior to the access any nonfamily shareholder would
have174 because Chestman was in a position to hear stock information from the
husband of a Waldbaum family member. In fact, this information was superior
to the knowledge that any other broker not connected to the Waldbaum family
would have. This special access created a structural inequality, which should
trigger a requirement of disclosure. Chestman, because of his inside connections,
simply had lower costs of acquiring this information than anyone else in his
position. He learned information because he was Keith Loeb's broker, and Loeb
needed to go through Chestman to effect his purchase in the first place.
Chestman had superior access to information because of the connections he
had, but a contractarian analysis does not require, as does the current Supreme
Court theory, that all possible fiduciary relationships be scanned for specific
duties owed to specific people. Chestman's duty on the contractarian account
would be first to those with whom he was trading, shareholders who could not
yet know what he knew. And then, secondarily, a contractarian would ask
whether Chestman himself violated any confidences to make his deals.
Note that this analysis does not require that all parties to the trade have
equal information at the time of the transaction. If Chestman had bought stock
from Shirley Witkin, Keith's mother-in-law, the structural inequality would not
be present.1 75 Ms. Witkin would have, through intimate family ties, the same
access to information that Chestman had. Even if Ms. Witkin did not actually
know about the tender offer at the time she sold her stock, Chestman would not
have been in a position of structural inequality with her that would require
disclosure. Since, however, trades through markets strip away the individualizing
features from particular traders, further investigation would be needed to
uncover whether the parties who bought and sold particular shares through
174. The only other shareholders who could know were the family members, to whom an obligation
to disclose or abstain would also apply from the contractarian theory. If Chestman had traded with one
of the Waldbaums, both being insiders, the contractarian theory would have no problems with this trade
on inequality grounds.
175. Of course, Shirley would have no good reason to sell, knowing as she did that the price was
going up. If she did want to sell, it must be either because she was desperate to meet a deadline or
because she had made a mistake. Since all insiders with accurate knowledge will have incentives to buy
or sell in the same direction, actual trades between insiders are highly unlikely to occur in the real world.
One can assume that if an insider is buying from someone willing to sell, the seller must also not be an
insider. The example is useful, however, because it illustrates that the equal access theory does not
prohibit all insider trading. Insiders trading with insiders does not offend against this theory, precisely
because they are on equal footing. And the fact that such trades rarely occur should help us see why
the trades that occur with asymmetric information are occurring because of the inequality.
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exchanges had equal access to the information on which they traded. The typical
shareholder would not have such superior "inside" access and so the possessor
of inside information should not count on the fluke of two insiders trading in
opposite directions on the basis of hidden knowledge in order to justify the use
of inside information.
This does not exhaust the contractarian analysis, however. Consider the
argument from enforceable promises to keep secrets. Here a contractarian
would want to know whether there were understandings within the Waldbaum
family. Did Ms. Witkin and her daughter and did Susan and Keith Loeb have
understandings that business information would not be transmitted outside the
family? Since implicit understandings of promise-making can restrict the abilities
of people to act autonomously and in their own interests, anything short of an
explicit agreement not to pass on the information should not ground criminal
liability. In the context of family relationships, however, such explicit agreements
are quite awkward to make. In longstanding relationships between natural
persons, where a certain amount of trust has been established, it seems
unnecessary to require that every individual disclosure of confidential informa-
tion should be accompanied by a specific promise. The absence of an explicit
prior promise in the disclosures from Ms. Witkin to Susan, and from Susan to
Keith, could be viewed as evidence that the information was not confidential, but
the absence of such promises may also be evidence that there was so much trust
and confidence, and so much of an expectation of secrecy, that the explicit
promise "went without saying." Relationships built on a sense of dailiness and
trust are likely not to be accompanied by formal negotiations and specific
promises. The "gratuitous" nature of the promise that Susan extracted from
Keith, then, should probably be read more as a reminder of a preexisting
understanding than as an attempt by Susan unilaterally to impose an obligation
on Keith.
This argument would not apply in the corporate setting, however, since
individuals have more limited obligations to act in the interests of their
employers. In corporate settings, the duties of office must be made explicit to
prevent the creation of a "total institution" where individuals have no life outside
the office. 176
Judge Meskill's analysis in Chestman fails to recognize how special access to
information gives some traders an unfair advantage over others. In addition, the
failure to recognize enforceable promises to keep information secret in contexts
outside of employment contracts is likely to lead to a system where no one can
be trusted in intimate relationships and where people must be on their guard in
friendships and family relationships. Neither of Judge Meskill's arguments is
likely to attract consent as a general proposition on the part of people who can
imagine themselves on the losing end of these rules.
176. The concept of a total institution is explained in ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS 1-124 (1961).
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CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to show why a theory of insider trading based
solely on fiduciary duties, as currently used by the U.S. Supreme Court, is
inadequate to regulate insider trading. Not only does the theory fail to
acknowledge the equitable rules about fraud that have long been in use in U.S.
courts to deal with very similar cases involving disclosure of information, but it
also fails to acknowledge the more complicated and anonymous relationships that
now characterize corporate America.
This article proposes an argument from contractarian ethics to ground an
alternative vision of insider trading. Contractarian ethics captures much of the
spirit of equitable rules about disclosure, but puts those rules on a more coherent
and rational footing than previous analyses have done. A theory of equal access
to information, in contrast to a theory of equal information, would be most likely
to attract the consent of contemporary residents of the United States. A
complementary theory of enforceable promises could supplement the equal
access theory to deal with cases where the knowledge in question has damaged
those who disclosed the information to the inside trader in the first place.

